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RECOVERY FOR PSYCHIC HARM IN
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY: HAS THE
INTEREST IN PSYCHIC EQUILIBRIUM
COME THE FINAL MILE?
SUSANAH M. MEAD*
I. INTRODUCTION
More than a century has elapsed since Lord Wensleydale de-
clared that "[m]ental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and
does not pretend to redress, when the unlawful act complained of
causes that alone,"' and nearly a century has passed since Ameri-
can courts first denied recovery for psychic injuries. 2 Plaintiffs suf-
fering tortiously inflicted psychic harm, however, have continued
to seek legal redress. Though the road has been uphill and the
journey torturously slow, the march toward legal recognition of
psychic equilibrium as an independently-protected interest has
been significant. Gradually, psychic harm has evolved from an item
of damage recoverable only if parasitic to another cause of action,'
to a harm recompensed when caused intentionally;4 and, more re-
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana School of Law; B.A., Smith College, 1969; J.D.,
Indiana University, Indianapolis. The author wishes to express her gratitude to her research
assistants, Herbert Hintze and Kathleen Shortridge.
Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861).
2 See Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 420, 51 N.E. 657, 664 (1898); Spade v. Lynn &
Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 286, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897), overruled, Dziokonski v. Babineau,
375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Ward v. West Jersey & Sea Shore R.R., 65 N.J.L.
383, 385, 47 A. 561, 561 (1900), overruled, Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965);
see also Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 109, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896), overruled,
Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Huston v.
Fremansburg Borough, 212 Pa. 548, 549, 61 A. 1022, 1022 (1905), overruled, Niederman v.
Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). But see Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 214-15, 13
S.W. 59, 59 (1890) (recovery for fright-induced miscarriage caused by plaintiff's witnessing
violent assault), overruled, Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983).
See, e.g., Gadsen Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 532, 103 So. 553, 554 (1925)
(false imprisonment); Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 603, 64 N.E. 9, 10 (1902) (assault); Fisher
v. Rumler, 239 Mich. 224, 228, 214 N.W. 310, 311 (1927) (false imprisonment); Goodrich,
Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 MICH. L. REV. 497, 504 (1922); Harper & Mc-
Neely, A Re-examination of the Basis for Emotional Distress, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 426, 429;
Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARv. L. REV. 260, 279-81 (1921).
4 See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 138-39, 25 S.W.2d 428, 428 (1930); State
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cently, to a harm redressed when caused negligently.5 Despite
these broad developments, however, many courts are still reluctant
to offer full-scale protection to the interest in psychic equilibrium.
In contrast to the slow emergence of psychic equilibrium as an
independently recognized interest, the area of strict products lia-
bility has burst suddenly from the common law of torts in just the
past two decades to protect the American consumer from the inju-
ries caused by defective products.6 Since 1965, when the American
Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 333, 240 P.2d 282, 285 (1952); Barnett
v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 1310-11, 242 N.W. 25, 28 (1932); see also Givelber,
The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUm. L. REV. 42, 43 (1982)
(mere intent to cause harm suffered may give rise to liability for psychic injury); Prosser,
Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 40-43 (1956); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of
Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REv. 874, 878 (1939) [hereinafter cited as Pros-
ser, Suffering].
5 See Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981); Dillon v.
Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 747-48, 441 P.2d 912, 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 85 (1968); Montinieri v.
Southern N.E. Co., 175 Conn. 337, 345-46, 398 A.2d 1180, 1184 (1978); Miller, The Scope of
Liability for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Making "The Punishment Fit the
Crime," 1 U. HAWAII L. REv. 1, 3-9 (1979); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress:
The Case for an Independent Tort, 59 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1245-48 (1971); Comment, Negligence
and the Infliction of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U.
CHI. L. REV. 512, 514-17 (1968).
' The first formulation of a strict products liability doctrine appeared in a concurring
opinion by Justice Traynor in 1944. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). It was not until 1966, however, that
the doctrine was actually adopted. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 57,
377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962). In Greenman, the court held: "A manufac-
turer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to
be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being." Id.
The development of products liability as the basis for recovery began long before either
Escola or Yuba. A major step in this development occurred in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), in which Judge Cardozo abolished the requirement
of privity in cases involving negligently manufactured products. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1055.
Other jurisdictions quickly adopted the rule that lack of privity is not a defense in a negli-
gence action for a defective product. See, e.g., Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Co., 261 F. 878 (2d
Cir. 1919).
A second major development in the growth of products liability was the recognition of
implied warranties of quality in the sale of products. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978)
(merchantability); id. § 2-315 (fitness for particular purpose); see also Southern Iron and
Equip. Co. v. Railway Co., 151 S.C. 506, 525, 149 S.E. 271, 278 (1929) (implied warranty of
freedom from defects). Although privity was initially a requirement in implied warranty
cases, see Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 624, 135 P. 633, 634 (1913), the majority
of American jurisdictions eventually recognized that lack of vertical privity was not a de-
fense for breach of an implied warranty in the sale of products, see, e.g., Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 384, 161 A.2d 69, 84 (1960); see U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978);
Prosser, Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 791-
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Law Institute adopted section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts,7 virtually all jurisdictions have embraced strict products
liability.'
It is not difficult to imagine accidents caused by defective
products which result in psychic rather than physical injury-a de-
fective mobile home catches fire causing an occupant who escapes
with no physical injuries to suffer a severe traumatic neurosis;9 a
defective car door unlatches, causing a child to fall to the highway
and causing his mother to suffer a severe psychic shock.10 Thus, it
was inevitable that these two areas of law-strict products liability
and recovery for psychic harm-would intersect. Recently, a num-
800 (1966).
Despite the abolition of the privity requirement in negligence and warranty actions,
plaintiffs continued to experience difficulty in recovering for product-related injuries. One
such difficulty arose in proving negligence in a products case. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 457-58, 150 P.2d 436, 438-39 (1944). In warranty actions, defenses
such as lack of notice and disclaimers of warranty prevented recovery. See Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61-62, 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962);
U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-607 (1978).
These difficulties have, to a great extent, been alleviated with the development of strict
products liability as a basis for recovery, and, more particularly, with the drafting of section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see infra note 7 and accompanying text.
7 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Section 402A provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
8 See, e.g., Pardue v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 407 N.E.2d 1154, 1155-56 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980) (manufacturer strictly liable for personal injuries caused by explosion of bottle);
Magee v. Jefferson Rental, 454 So. 2d 842, 845 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (recovery for injuries
caused by negligently manufactured blade guards on power saw); Russel v. Ford Motor Co.,
281 Or. 587, 589-90, 575 P.2d 1383, 1384 (1978) (manufacturer strictly liable for damage to
plaintiff's truck caused by defective axle); see 1 R. HURSH & E. BAILEY, AmERicAN LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4.41 (2d ed. 1973); W. PRossEn & W. KEzTON, THE LAW OF TORTS 694
(W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984); Maleson, Negligence is Dead but its Doctrines Rule Us From the
Grave: A Proposal to Limit Defendant's Responsibility in Strict Products Liability Actions
Without Resort to Proximate Cause, 51 TEMP. L.Q. 1, 1-2 (1978).
9 See Rahn v. Gerdts, 119 IM. App. 3d 781, 783, 455 N.E.2d 807, 808 (1983).
10 See Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 18-19, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613-14
(1977).
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ber of courts have considered whether damages for emotional dis-
tress are recoverable in a strict products liability action." The re-
sults have been inconsistent, both in the conclusions reached and
in the legal analyses used to reach them.
The specific question to be examined in this Article is whether
damages for psychic harm should be recoverable in a case based on
strict products liability. In answering that question, it is necessary
to consider first whether the law should at last confer its full pro-
tection upon the interest in psychic equilibrium. If, as this Article
suggests, the time finally has come to characterize this interest as
one worthy of independent legal recognition, the answer to the spe-
cific question posed should be "yes."' 2 Not surprisingly, courts are
reluctant to extend recovery for psychic harm to cases based on
strict products liability. This resistance may be traced to at least
three sources: (1) a continued refusal to recognize psychic equilib-
rium as an interest worthy of complete legal protection, (2) a fear
that claims flowing from the protection of the interest will over-
whelm the judicial system, and (3) a fear that limitless liability will
result.' 3
On one hand, if an important interest has been invaded, it is
irrational to deny recovery in a case based on strict products liabil-
ity while allowing recovery in a case based on negligence or inten-
tional tort. On the other hand, it would be naive not to recognize
the legitimate concern of courts and scholars (not to mention prod-
uct suppliers and their insurance carriers) engendered by the re-
cent products liability explosion. 4 The goal of this Article is to de-
vise a system for protecting the interest in psychic equilibrium
without placing an undue burden on either the judicial system or
the product manufacturer. To achieve that goal, this Article will
focus first on the interest itself and the need to grant it full legal
'I See, e.g., id. at 18-19, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 613 (recovery permitted); Rahn v. Gerdts, 119
Ill. App. 3d 781, 783, 455 N.E.2d 807, 808 (1983) (no recovery); Rickey v. Chicago Transit
Auth., 101 Ill. App. 3d 439, 443, 428 N.E.2d 596, 599 (1981) (no recovery), aff'd, 98 Ill. 2d
546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983); Woodill v. Parke-Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 354-55, 374
N.E.2d 683, 687-88 (1978) (no recovery), afl'd, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980); Walker
v. Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561, 563 (Iowa 1982) (recovery permitted); see Joseph,
Dillon's Other Leg: The Extension of the Doctrine Which Permits Bystander Recovery for
Emotional Trauma and Physical Injuries to Actions Based on Strict Liability in Tort, 18
DuQ. L. REv. 1, 22-42 (1979); Note, Emotional Distress in Products Liability: Distinguishing
Users From Bystanders, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 299-301 (1981).
12 See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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protection. Second, it will examine various methods of limiting lia-
bility in strict products liability cases dealing with psychic harm
and recommend an effective one which will allow for full protection
of the interest in psychic equilibrium without imposing overly bur-
densome liability. Finally, the Article will review the recent cases
to determine how courts have actually dealt with psychic harm in a
strict products liability context and point out how these courts
might have more effectively resolved the various problems
presented.
II. THE INTEREST IN PSYCHIC EQUILIBRIUM
The slow progress of the interest in psychic equilibrium from a
legal non-entity toward legal recognition has been amply and ably
chronicled elsewhere. 15 However, to explore fully the implications
of extending recovery for psychic injury to a strict products liabil-
ity context, and to understand the varying judicial responses to it,
an examination of the interest itself and its struggle for complete
legal recognition is necessary.
A. Nature of the Interest in Psychic Equilibrium
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines interest as "an ob-
ject of human desire. 16 It is the function of the law of torts to
protect certain interests from unwarranted invasions and to pro-
vide a system of compensation when those invasions cause injury.
Keeping our bodies and property free from harm is an object of
human desire which has been afforded broad protection through
the tort law system. However, we cannot hope to enjoy fully our
physical well-being or our earthly possessions if our minds are in
distress. The medical profession has long recognized that good
mental health is an integral part of a healthy individual." Because
5 Seee.g., Langhenry, Personal Injury Law and Emotional Distress, 9 J. PSYCH. & L.
91 (1981); Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by Physical Injury
to Another, 15 J. FAm L. 163, 165-68 (1976-1977); Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33 HASTNGS L.J. 583, 583-87 (1982);
see also Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A
Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 477, 501-13 (1982); Simons,
Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Transcontinental Dispute Between California and
New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. RV. 1, 22-26 (1976).
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1 (1965).
27 See, e.g., G. JACOBY, THE UNSOUND MND AND THE LAw 19-52 (1918); A. WATSON, Psy-
CHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 42-70 (1978).
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of its profound effect on the realization of other human desires, the
interest in psychic equilibrium merits the utmost protection. From
the standpoint of tort law, however, this protection has not been
achieved. An analysis of the concept of psychic equilibrium may
reveal why such a vital interest has gained only partial legal pro-
tection, and why the protection it has received has been so slow in
developing.
One problem has been definitional. The nature of the interest
is difficult to describe. 8 Although many terms can be used to char-
acterize the interest-mental tranquility, emotional stability,
mental equilibrium, mental repose, peace of mind-none captures
its essence. This difficulty of positive definition may be the reason
why, more often than not, the interest is spoken of in terms of the
harm done to it-the interest in freedom from emotional or mental
distress, fright, mental anxiety, and mental anguish. This may, in
fact, provide a more accurate characterization. Tort law cannot
guarantee perfect happiness, but it stands ready to afford redress
when a course of conduct, recognized as unacceptable to society,
has caused harm. Fright, anxiety, distress, and anguish, though
they remain within the psychic realm, are harms with which most
of us can identify. Furthermore, in this difficult area, courts are
perhaps more comfortable expressing themselves in terms that re-
late to digressions from societal expectations concerning socially
acceptable behavior. The best the law can offer is protection
against tortious invasions that interfere with whatever mental bal-
ance one has been able to achieve. For lack of more precise terms,
this interest will be referred to as "psychic equilibrium" and inju-
ries to this interest as "psychic harm."' 9
In addition to definitional problems, the interest in psychic
equilibrium suffers from content problems as well. Psychic harm
Is See Smith, Problems of Proof in Psychic Injury Cases, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 586, 587
(1963).
19 The word "psychic" was chosen because it is a broader term than either "emotional"
or "mental" and includes both. In addition, it has more accurate medical significance than
emotional or mental. "Psyche refers to the mind; the mental life including both the con-
scious and unconscious process." Cantor, Psychosomatic Injury, Traumatic Psychoneurosis,
and Law, 6 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 428, 430 (1957).
The word "equilibrium" was chosen because it has fewer positive connotations than
words like tranquility, repose and peace of mind. Since the most the majority of us can hope
for is some kind of balance or stability, the word equilibrium comes close to expressing this.
It is defined as: "la: a state of adjustment between opposing or divergent influences or ele-
ments; b: a state of intellectual or emotional balance ... 2: a state of balance between
opposing forces or actions." WEBSTsR'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 294 (1983).
[Vol. 59:457
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can take many forms-fear, depression, anger, embarrassment,
grief, and neurosis are all types of psychic suffering. The harm may
be trivial and transitory or it may be serious and abiding.20 More-
over, psychic responses to the same external stimuli may vary con-
siderably from person to person.21 A psychic shock may cause in-
somnia and severe depression in one person, vomiting and
debilitating headaches in another, and no long-term negative ef-
fects in still another.22
The infinite number of forms that psychic distress can take is
exceeded by the infinite number of stimuli that can cause it. It can
be caused, for example, by a sudden apprehension that one is in
immediate danger,23 by an observation of injury to a loved one,24
by giving birth to a deformed child,25 by living with the knowledge
that one may someday contract a serious disease, 26 or by knowl-
edge that one has been instrumental in causing harm to another.2 7
On the other hand, such distress may occur spontaneously and be
traceable to no known or discernible cause. The amorphous charac-
ter and subjective nature of the interest in psychic equilibrium it-
self, the large variety of harms affecting it, and the difficulty in
determining the level of suffering have made it an elusive concept.
Perhaps the most precise description of the legal interest in
psychic equilibrium is the right not to have one's psychological
boat rocked through a course of conduct that the law has deemed
socially unacceptable. To the extent that harm caused by the rock-
ing can be established, the tort compensation system should pro-
vide redress.
B. Justifications Used to Deny Protection to the Interest in
Psychic Equilibrium
Early courts considering whether to grant relief to plaintiffs
20 See Smith, Relations of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability or Psychic
Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 281-91 (1944).
21 See Smith, supra note 18, at 591.
22 See id. at 613 (possible reactions tQ stimuli); see also id. at 604 (cases should be
individually evaluated because response may be disproportionate to stimuli).
22 See, e.g., Allen v. Hannaford, 138 Wash. 423, 426, 244 P. 700, 701 (1926).
24 See, e.g., Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 18, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613
(1977).
21 See, e.g., Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 84, 439 A.2d 110, 114 (1981).
28 See, e.g., Adams v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 1984).
27 See, e.g., Kately v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 588, 195 Cal. Rptr. 902, 909
(1984).
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suffering psychic harm concluded that injuries to the mind were
too trivial and their physical consequences too remote to warrant
legal protection.28 The injuries were thought too difficult to prove,
too easy to feign, and likely to impose too taxing a burden on the
courts.29
A primary reason for the early rejection of claims for psychic
harm was ignorance of the workings of the mind. The late nine-
teenth century jurist had little empirical information relating to
the potential for serious suffering that invasions of psychic equilib-
rium could cause. Even if a jurist thought psychic harm might be
serious, there existed no methods for acquiring proof that a partic-
ular claim was genuine, because the psychiatric branch of medicine
was in its infancy. Since that time, however, psychiatric medicine
has developed methods to plumb the depths of the psyche.30 In
light of these developments, the former assumption that psychic
harm is trivial can no longer be accepted. It is now clear that
psychic injuries can be both devastating and permanent.
Despite an increased understanding of the workings of the
mind, the current concerns expressed by courts and tort scholars
to some extent reiterate those of yesteryear. The most recent edi-
tion of Dean Prosser's treatise on torts 31 has recognized the three
'8 See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 355 (1896) (consensus
of opinion that no recovery may be granted for mere fright), overruled, Batalla v. State, 10
N.Y.2d 237, 238, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35 (1961); see also Braun v. Craven,
175 Ill. 401, 413, 51 N.E. 657, 661 (1898) (nervous shock too remote to be considered proxi-
mately caused by negligence); Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 224 Pa. 13, 17, 73
A. 4, 6 (1909) (shock not natural and probable result of defendant's conduct); Victorian Ry.
Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 225-26 (1888) (nervous shock not an ordinary or
natural consequence of negligence).
29 See Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 317, 73 So. 205, 207
(1916); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 355 (1896), overruled,
Batalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). The Baladoni court
stated:
Damages, when confined to fright alone, is dealing with metaphysical, as con-
tradistinguished from a physical, condition, with something subjective instead of
objective, and entirely within the realm of speculation. So the damages suffered
where the only manifestation is fright are too subtle and speculative to be capable
of admeasurement by any standard known to the law.
15 Ala. App. at 317, 73 So. at 207. The Mitchell court observed that a grant of recovery for
psychic harm would "naturally result in a flood of litigation in cases where the injury com-
plained of may be easily feigned without detection, and where the damages must rest upon
mere conjecture or speculation." 151 N.Y. at 110, 45 N.E. at 354-55.
30 See Wasmuth, Medical Evaluation of Mental Pain and Suffering, 6 CLEv.-MAa. L
REv. 7, 7-11 (1957).
31 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8.
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continuing concerns in psychic injury cases as: (1) the trivial claim;
(2) the falsified or imagined harm; and (3) the unfairness of impos-
ing liability not in proportion to the negligent defendant's degree
of fault.32
Although the fear of the false or trivial claim may once have
had merit, it should no longer be troublesome. Just as modern psy-
chiatry has discovered that injuries to the psyche may be devastat-
ing, it has also developed methods for determining whether serious
psychic harm has actually occurred.3 3 Thus, malingerers and liars
may now be identified with a greater degree of certainty. Unlike
most physical injuries, psychic harm can not objectively be ob-
11 See id. § 54, at 360-61. The concerns expressed in the fifth edition of Dean Prosser's
treatise significantly differ from those appearing in the fourth edition, in which it is stated
that "the only valid objection against recovery for mental injury is the danger of vexatious
suits and fictitious claims." Compare W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54
(4th ed. 1972) with W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, § 54, at 360-61.
" Research advances in the field of "Psychosomatic Medicine" were largely responsible
for assisting a plaintiff in satisfying the burden of proof that his claim was genuine. See
McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 81 n.265
(1949). For purposes of this discussion, the research may be divided into two general catego-
ries. Category I was primarily concerned with the identification of the signs-"those objec-
tive evidences of impaired structure, or function, which the trained observer can discover for
himself by visual inspection or various means of examination, without relying upon the story
the plaintiff tells him"-and symptoms---"subjective complaints, known only to the patient,
such as headache, pain, ringing in the ears, etc."-that result from psychic harm. See Smith,
supra note 18, at 593; see also Goodrich, supra note 3, at 498 (experimentation and observa-
tion have demonstrated effect of emotional distress on body). See generally Smith, supra
note 20, at 212-26 (classification of emotional effects on physical well-being). By 1940, it was
recognized that a powerful emotional stimulus could result in the following physiological
harms: hypertension, neurocirculatory asthenia, tremors and contractures, mucous colitis,
dyspepsia and gastritis, retention of urine, enuresis, impotence, dysmenorrhea, and Graves
Disease. See Smith, supra note 20, at 217-19. Additionally, it was recognized that an indi-
vidual's idiosyncrasies affected the severity of the resulting harm. Id. at 282; see also
Havard, Reasonable Foresight of Nervous Shock, 19 MOD. L. REv. 478, 478-82 (1956) (reac-
tion to shock may depend on predisposition to damages).
Research in Category H was concerned with the initial physiological reaction to an emo-
tional stimulus. It was found that an individual goes through three distinct stages in re-
sponse to an emotional stimulus. See Wasmuth, supra note 30, at 11. In Stage I (alarm
reaction), the brain reacts to the stimulus, the adrenal gland secretes epinephrine into the
bloodstream, the sugar content of the blood increases, breathing accelerates, and the heart
rate quickens. Id. In Stage 11 (defense stage), the increase in epinephrine causes an increase
in the hormone ACTH. This hormone prepares the body for prolonged resistance to the
stimulus. Id. In Stage III (recovery stage), the body begins to repair itself if the stimulus
was of a short duration and has been overcome. Id. If the stimulus persists, the body re-
mains in Stage H or reverts to Stage I. See id. at 12. Additionally, accurate clinical tests
were developed to evaluate the emotional trauma. See id. at 13. For example, it was found
that variations in the number and changes in the structure of the white blood cells occurred
as an individual went through the different stages. Id.
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served and is not likely to be within the ken of the average jury.
The nature and extent of psychic injuries can be conveyed to the
court and jury only through expert psychiatric testimony, the value
of which has been the subject of considerable controversy. 4 If
courts continue to express distrust of expert psychiatric testimony
regarding the genuineness of psychic injury, progress toward com-
plete recognition of the interest in psychic equilibrium will be
impeded.
The continuing fear that burdensome and disproportionate li-
ability will be imposed on tortfeasors in cases involving psychic
harm3 5 is evinced by comment b to section 436A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, which states that "where the defendant
has been merely negligent, without any element of intent to do
harm, his fault is not so great that he should be required to make
good a purely mental disturbance. '36 Apparently, the inference to
be drawn is that the interest in being free from psychic harm is not
important enough to be granted protection against tortious inva-
sions of all kinds. Although the perceived problem of dispropor-
tionate liability has been considered in relation to claims for negli-
gently caused psychic harm, 7 it has even greater impact when the
theory underlying the action is strict products liability. Because i-
ability may be imposed without regard to the defendant's culpabil-
ity, in a strict liability case any amount of liability imposed would
be wholly disproportionate to the degree of fault attributed to him.
Thus, when the degree of culpability is a factor, the plaintiff in a
strict products liability case would be without redress. To achieve
full protection, the interest in psychic equilibrium must be recog-
nized and vindicated regardless of the theory underlying the plain-
tiff's case or the culpability of the defendant.
Another difficulty that recently has troubled courts and schol-
, See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 437-38, 551 P.2d 334,
344-45, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 24-25 (1976); J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOG-
ICAL TESTIMONY 295-303 (2d ed. 1975); Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 430
(1952).
11 See Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 553, 437 N.E. 2d 171, 179-80 (1982). See
generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, § 54, at 361 (perceived unfairness in
imposing disproportionate financial burdens on a defendant); Miller, supra note 5, at 18-21
(disproportionate allocation of losses is key to problem of extending liability for psychic
disturbance).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A, comment b (1965).
'T See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 552-54, 437 N.E.2d 171, 178-80
(1982).
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ars considering the interest in psychic equilibrium is the potential
for unlimited and indefinite liability.8 In fact, some courts regard
this as the only legitimate reason remaining for denying full-scale
protection to psychic equilibrium.3 9 Although most of the discus-
sion of this problem has centered on negligence, the problems are
magnified in a strict products liability context, because traditional
liability limitations such as proximate cause, contributory negli-
gence, and various other defenses may be doctrinally inconsistent
with a strict liability theory.40
Before the interest in psychic equilibrium can attain full legal
recognition, the concerns discussed previously must be addressed
and resolved. If protecting the interest would impose an onerous
burden either on the judicial system or on product suppliers in
strict liability cases, a careful weighing of competing interests
should be undertaken. The interest in psychic equilibrium can be
adequately protected and liability appropriately limited, however,
without resort to arbitrary limitations or unjust line-drawing
devices.
C. History of Judicial Approaches to Psychic Equilibrium
To understand contemporary judicial and scholarly attitudes
toward recovery for psychic harm, it is necessary to examine at
least briefly the evolutionary process that the interest in psychic
equilibrium has undergone in the last century. If the reasons for
denying recovery expressed by early courts have in fact been met
and can be overcome, the interest in psychic equilibrium should be
ready to take the final step to complete independence. However,
an examination of recent cases reveals that several of the arbitrary
line-drawing and liability-limiting devices used by early courts
See, e.g., Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 Idaho 840, 849-50, 606 P.2d
944, 953 (1980); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 IMI. 2d 546, 555, 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1983);
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615-17, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558-60
(1969); see also Miller, supra note 5, at 17-18; Note, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Dis-
tress as an Independent Cause of Action in California: Do Defendants Face Unlimited
Liability? 22 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 181, 182 (1982) ; Note, Rickey v. Chicago Transit Author-
ity: Consistent Limitation on Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in
Illinois, 17 J. MAR. L. REv. 563, 576-77 (1984).
39 See, e.g., Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 115, 593 P.2d 668, 669 (1979); Barnhill v.
Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 1981); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 618-19, 249
N.E.2d 419, 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 561 (1969).
40 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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have carried over.41 Nevertheless, the legal status of the interest in
psychic equilibrium has improved over the years, giving substance
to Professor Street's observation that, "[a] factor which is to-day
recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, to-morrow be recognized as
an independent basis of liability. '42 Recognition of psychic harm as
an independent basis of liability has not been reached completely,
but the development of the interest in psychic equilibrium has, to
date, followed classic lines.43
1. Recovery for Psychic Harm Parasitic to Another Action
Early English 44 and American 4 cases granted no independent
protection to psychic equilibrium. .Recovery for psychic harm was
first allowed as an item of damage "parasitic" to a "host" tort.46
Such a recovery was permitted whether the "host" cause of action
was based on negligence, intentional tort, or strict liability.47 Proof
of the prima facie case in the "host" tort allayed the courts' fears
41 See, e.g., Champion v. Gray, 420 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Selfe v.
Smith, 397 So. 2d 348, 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
In Selfe, the plaintiff, who was injured along with her son in a car collision, was denied
recovery for her mental distress over her child's facial injury. See 397 So. 2d at 350. The
court, in denying recovery, indicated that the "impact rule" had not been satisfied. See id.
The impact rule has been defended as "verifying otherwise problematic injuries, or as draw-
ing a needed if somewhat arbitrary line between compensable injuries and those that society
requires be borne unrecompensed." Id.
In Champion, the plaintiff's wife died as a result of shock and grief caused by the sight
of her daughter being struck and killed by the defendant's car. See 420 So. 2d at 349. The
court held that since Florida adhered to the impact rule, damages could not be recovered for
mental distress in the absence of physical impact. See id.
42 1 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906).
41 See id.; Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49
HARv. L. REV. 1033, 1067 (1936); Smith, supra note 20, at 193-212.
44 See, e.g., Victorian Rys. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222, 225-26 (1888); Cham-
berlain v. Boyd, 11 Q.B.D. 407, 412 (1883); Allsop v. Allsop, 157 Eng. Rep. 1292, 1294 (1861).
45 See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 286, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897) (no recov-
ery for mental distress absent physical harm), overruled, Dzionski v. Babineau, 375 Mass.
555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 109, 45 N.E. 354, 354
(1896) (plaintiff cannot recover for injuries occasioned by fright), overruled, Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Huston v. Borough of
Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 550-51, 61 A. 1022, 1022-23 (1905) (no recovery for fright uncon-
nected with physical injury), overruled, Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84
(1970).
4 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
4' See Easton v. United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 201, 159 P. 597,
599 (1916); Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 292, 23
S.W.2d 272, 275 (1929); Consolidated Traction Co. v. Lamberston, 59 N.J.L. 297, 302, 36 A.
100, 102 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1896), afl'd, 60 N.J.L. 457, 38 A. 684 (1897).
RECOVERY FOR PSYCHIC HARM
that the claims were trivial or could not be satisfactorily proven.
Under this approach, protection was at best indirect, because re-
covery was dependent on the existence of another tort action.
2. Intentional Infliction of Psychic Harm
The first major step toward recognition of psychic equilibrium
as an important independent interest came with the protection
against intentional inflictions of emotional distress. 48 Despite per-
suasive prompting from tort scholars, this step was taken with
great hesitancy and fear of possible adverse consequences. 49 Al-
though English courts, prior to 1900, recognized intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress,50 no American court acknowledged it
until the middle of the twentieth century."1 Since that time, how-
ever, intentional infliction of emotional distress has been regarded
as an actionable wrong, with independent tort status.52
An examination of early cases recognizing intentional infliction
of emotional distress as an independent cause of action reveals
that the willingness to extend this protection was directly tied to
the high degree of moral culpability of one who intentionally
caused injury. 3 Because courts were insecure about the damage as-
pect of cases in which the only harm claimed was psychic, they
focused instead on the egregious behavior of the defendant.
54 If
48 See Gadsden Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton, 212 Ala. 531, 532-33, 103 So. 553, 554-55
(1925); State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d. 330, 333, 240 P.2d 282, 284-85
(1952).
9 See Givelber, supra note 4, at 46; Prosser, supra note 4, at 40; Prosser, Suffering,
supra note 4, at 878-79. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at 55-56.
80 See Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57.
" See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 333, 240 P.2d 282, 285
(1952); see also Prosser, supra note 4, at 40.
52 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). Section 46 provides, in pertinent
part: "(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm." Id.
53 See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilkins, 181 Ark. 137, 139, 25 S.W.2d 428, 428 (1930) (recovery
for mental stress allowed when defendant committed wanton wrongs against plaintiff in-
tending to cause such distress); Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 255, 135 P.2d 330, 332
(1943) (recovery for mental distress permitted "when induced by threats, verbal abuse, in-
dignity, and wanton insult"); see Prosser, Suffering, supra note 4, at 878.
See, e.g., Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 358, 272 P.2d 349, 351 (1954) (police falsely
represented to plaintiff that her husband and child were hospitalized with critical injuries);
Digsby v. Carroll Baking Co., 76 Ga. App. 656, 659-61, 47 S.E.2d 203, 206-07 (1948) (use of
profane language and threat of rape to collect debt from pregnant woman); Great Atl. &
Pac. Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 191, 153 A. 22, 23 (1931) (grocer delivered dead rat
instead of loaf of bread to plaintiff); Wilkinson v. Downton, [1897] 2 Q.B. 57 (practical joker
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medical science has developed sufficient expertise to determine
whether psychic harm is real and serious however, courts no longer
need to refer to the character of the defendant's behavior to deter-
mine whether damages should be awarded.
3. Negligent Infliction of Psychic Harm
The movement toward awards of damages for negligently
caused psychic injuries has met with significant resistance, but per-
sistent plaintiffs have continued to appeal to the courts for relief.
Gradually, judicial opposition has diminished, and a growing num-
ber of jurisdictions now recognize a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.5 Most jurisdictions entertaining
such claims, however, retain some limitation on the right to re-
cover.5 6 In some instances, these limitations appear to be traceable
to the early ignorance and distrust of psychic matters, 7 while in
others they are imposed as line-drawing mechanisms designed to
cut off liability. 5 In most cases, the limitations bear little rational
relation to any legitimate reason for denying recovery and are
therefore arbitrary.
The impact rule, which found much favor with the early
informed woman that her husband was seriously injured in accident).
" See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741-48, 441 P.2d 912, 921-25, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81-
85 (1968); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 173-74, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970); Homans v.
Boston Elevated Ry., 180 Mass. 456, 457-58, 62 N.E. 737, 737 (1902); Okrina v. Midwestern
Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 405-06, 165 N.W.2d 259, 263-64 (1969); Russ v. Western Union TeL
Co., 222 N.C. 504, 506, 23 S.E.2d 681, 682 (1943).
See infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
5 See Woodman v. Dever, 367 So. 2d 1061, 1062-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Barnhill
v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981). The Woodman court denied recovery for emo-
tional distress sustained by a child who had witnessed the rape of her mother. See 367 So.
2d at 1062-63. The court indicated that there was no valid justification to retreat from the
impact rule, reasoning that psychic injury could be easily feigned. Id. In an effort to guaran-
tee the genuineness of the claim, the Barnhill court required that the plaintiff bystander
actually fear that the victim would be seriously injured. See 300 N.W.2d at 108.
58 See McGovern v. Piccolo, 33 Conn. Supp. 225, 229, 372 A.2d 989, 991 (1976); Tobin
v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615-18, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 559-61
(1969). In Tobin, the plaintiff suffered mental distress after arriving at the scene of her
child's injury. 34 N.Y.2d at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 554-55. In denying
recovery, the court conceded that mental distress was foreseeable to the defendant, but re-
jected the foreseeability approach as an inadequate test that would subject the defendant to
unlimited liability. Id. at 615-18, 249 N.E.2d at 422-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 558-61.
In McGovern, the plaintiff was denied recovery for mental distress caused by witnessing
the death of her son. 33 Conn. Supp. at 226, 372 A.2d at 990. The court indicated that
allowing recovery would raise serious policy questions in terms of exposing the defendant to
virtually limitless liability. Id. at 229, 372 A.2d at 991.
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courts, was an outgrowth of the parasitic damage approach, under
which damages for psychic harm caused by negligence were al-
lowed when appended to a claim of contemporaneous physical in-
jury.5 As courts began to realize that serious psychic disturbance
might occur in the absence of serious physical disturbance, the rule
evolved that damages for psychic harm were recoverable if accom-
panied by "physical impact."6 In many cases the physical impact
was minimal and bore little, if any, relation to the nature and ex-
tent of the psychic harm.6 1 Thus, the rule was ineffective in aiding
courts in disposing of trivial or unworthy claims. A number of
courts, though recognizing the arbitrary nature of the impact rule
and the importance of psychic equilibrium, nevertheless continued
to apply this standard as a method for limiting liability until quite
recently.62 The absurd results and arbitrary nature of the impact
rule have caused all but a few jurisdictions to abandon it."
Although the majority of jurisdictions have rejected the im-
pact requirement as arbitrary and unhelpful, courts have contin-
ued to search for some objective guarantee of the genuineness of
the psychic harm. A number of jurisdictions have settled on a re-
quirement that the psychic harm manifest itself physically.6 4
89 See Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 292-93,
23 S.W.2d 272, 275 (1929) (recovery permitted when physical impact requirement satisfied);
Consolidated Traction Co. v. Lambertson, 59 N.J.L. 297, 302, 36 A. 100, 102 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1896) (damages caused by fright recoverable when impact has occurred); Duty v.
General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 20, 273 S.W.2d 64, 65-66 (1954) (physical harm essential to
existence of tort of mental distress).
60 See Van de Venter v. Chicago City Ry., 26 F. 32, 35 (C.C.N.D. IlM. 1885); Beaty v.
Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688, 697 (E.D. Ark. 1959); Braun v. Craven, 175
nM. 401, 420, 51 N.E. 657, 664 (1898).
61 See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 582, 144 S.E.2d 680, 681
(1928) (circus horse excretion landing on plaintiff's lap); Porter v. Delaware Lackawanna W.
R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 406, 63 A. 860, 860 (1906) (dust in eyes); Morton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St.
115, 115, 170 N.E. 869, 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke).
62 See, e.g., Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 287, 47 N.E. 88, 90 (1897),
overruled, Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 556, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1296 (1978).
63 See, e.g., Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d 546, 551, 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1983);
Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 771-72 (Mo. 1983)(en banc); Dziokonski v. Babineau,
375 Mass. 555, 559, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1297-98, 1302 (1978); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237,
240, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 35-36 (1961).
Among the jurisdictions retaining the impact rule are Florida, see Peacock v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 432 So. 2d 142, 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), Georgia, see Hamil-
ton v. Powell, Goldstein, Fraser & Murphy, 252 Ga. 149, 151, 311 S.E.2d 818, 819 (1984),
and Indiana, see Little v. Williamson, 441 N.E.2d 974, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
4 See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs., 386 Mass. 540, 555, 437 N.E.2d 171, 181 (1982);
Vicnire v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 401 A.2d 148, 155 (Me. 1979).
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Though the emphasis has shifted from physical harm that causes
psychic injury to psychic harm that results in physical injury, the
requirement of physical harm remains. Despite criticism charging
that this approach provides an inadequate method for distinguish-
ing between worthy and unworthy claims,6 5 many American juris-
dictions continue to apply it.6 Although the physical harm re-
quirement may arbitrarily exclude deserving claimants, it also
functions to limit liability.
Another method used to limit liability and guarantee the gen-
uineness of the claim is the requirement that the plaintiff be
within the physical zone of danger created by the defendant's act.6 7
Under this approach, if the defendant's negligent conduct creates
an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the plaintiff, and the
plaintiff suffers psychic harm as a direct result, the defendant is
liable. According to its advocates, the zone of danger approach pro-
vides a guarantee that the claim of psychic harm is legitimate.66 In
addition, it acts as a liability-limiting device that assists courts in
determining which plaintiffs should have their claims heard. Al-
"3 See, e.g., Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 79, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1983); Molien v.
Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 922, 616 P.2d 813, 818, 167 Cal Rptr. 831, 836 (1980).
" See, e.g., Bullard v. Central Vt. Ry., 565 F.2d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 1977); Martinez v.
Teague, 96 N.M. 446, 452, 631 P.2d 1314, 1320 (1981); Judd v. Rawley's Cherry Hill
Orchards, Inc., 611 P.2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980).
'7 See Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 III. 2d 546, 551, 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1983);
Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 554 (Minn. 1980); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61 N.Y.2d 219, 228-
29, 461 N.E.2d 843, 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 361 (1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 436 (1965). The zone of danger rule is viewed as the majority rule in the country
today. See Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d at 228 & n.6, 461 N.E.2d at 847 & n.6, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 361 &
n.6. Under this rule, a person within the zone of physical danger, who because of the negli-
gence of the defendant, fears for his own well-being, has a cause of action for physical harm
resulting from emotional distress. See Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 IlM. 2d at 555, 457
N.E.2d at 5.
Courts are consistent in recognizing the need for a limitation on psychic harm liability.
In Stadler, the Minnesota Supreme Court found the zone of danger limitation to be the
most consistent and convenient limitation. See 295 N.W.2d at 554.
New York courts have taken a slightly different view, basing the adoption of the rule on
traditional negligence concepts. See Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d at 229, 461 N.E.2d at 847, 473
N.Y.S.2d at 361. The court in Bovsun stated "that by unreasonably endangering the plain-
tiff's physical safety the defendant has breached a duty owed to him or her for which he or
she should recover all damages sustained including those occasioned by witnessing the suf-
fering of an immediate family member who is also injured by the defendant's conduct." Id.
0 See Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 553, 554 (Minn. 1980); Bovsun v. Sanperi, 61
N.Y.2d 219, 228-29, 461 N.E.2d 843, 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357, 361 (1984); Niederman v. Brod-
sky, 436 Pa. 401, 413, 261 A.2d 84, 90 (1970); see also Comment, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: Liability to the Bystander - Recent Developments, 30 MERCER L
REV. 735, 737 (1979).
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though the zone of danger rule is perhaps a slightly more realistic
method of dealing with recovery for psychic harm, the rule is actu-
ally another arbitrary line-drawing device.
The drawbacks of the zone of danger rule become strikingly
apparent in the "bystander" context in which the plaintiff claims
psychic harm caused not from fear of injury to himself, but from
observing injury to a loved one, usually a close relative. Although
the zone of danger might have some function in guaranteeing the
genuineness of a claim of fright for the plaintiff's own safety, it
clearly bears no relation at all to the kind of psychic harm suffered
as a consequence of witnessing injury to another. Whether one was
or was not within the zone of danger is irrelevant to the trauma of
seeing one's child run down by a negligently driven automobile.
The Supreme Court of California, in Dillon v. Legg,"9 was the first
American court to allow a bystander, outside the zone of danger, to
recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress. In rejecting the
zone of danger rule, the Dillon court purported to apply "general
rules of tort law, including the concepts of negligence, proximate
cause, and foreseeability.' '7 0 However, the decision resulted merely
in a series of foreseeability requirements:
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident
as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.
(2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observation
of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from
others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as con-
trasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of
only a distant relationship.71
Although these factors are relevant to a foreseeability inquiry, they
have hardened into another set of rules which, though more
favorable to plaintiffs, are no less arbitrary in application than the
impact rule, the zone of danger rule, or a rule simply denying re-
covery to bystanders.72
69 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
70 Id. at 746, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
71 Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
72 A recent case from the California Supreme Court indicates that the court does not
view the Dillon foreseeability factors as requirements, but rather as guidelines. In Ochoa v.
Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985), a mother who wit-
nessed the deterioration of her sick child over a period of days, but who was not present
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Since the Dillon decision, several jurisdictions have followed
suit, and at this point a growing minority of states have extended
recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress to plaintiff
bystanders outside of the zone of danger. 3 The majority of these
jurisdictions however, still require a showing of physical injury and
have either used the Dillon foreseeability factors or have devised
their own sets of rules.74
Several jurisdictions recently have abandoned arbitrary limita-
tions on recovery and have recognized a distinct cause of action for
the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 5 These jurisdictions
have specifically recognized that, in light of the advances in psychi-
atric medicine, proof of physical injury is not essential to establish-
when he died, stated a claim for emotional distress in spite of the fact that there was no
contemporaneous observation of a sudden traumatic event. Id. at 161-64, 703 P.2d at 3-6,
216 Cal. Rptr. at 663-66. The court also concluded, however, that the child's father, who
merely heard about the child's suffering from the child's mother, could not recover. Id. at
163 n.6, 703 P.2d at 5 n.6, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 665 n.6.
73 To date, at least fifteen jurisdictions have adopted either the Dillon approach or
some variation of it. See, e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 404, 520 P.2d 758, 764
(1974); Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1981); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermar-
kets, 444 A.2d 433, 436 (Me. 1982); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 568, 380 N.E.2d
1295, 1302 (1978); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 654, 207 N.W.2d 140, 145 (1973);
Entex, Inc. v. McGuire, 414 So. 2d 437, 444 (Miss. 1982); Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 653,
406 A.2d 300, 306 (1979); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 98-99, 417 A.2d 521, 526-27 (1980);
Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 539, 673 P.2d 822, 823 (1983); Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio
St. 3d 72, 76, 451 N.E.2d 759, 762 (1983); Sinn v. Burds, 486 Pa. 146, 149, 404 A.2d 672, 674
(1979); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 652, 338 A.2d 524, 531 (1975); Apache Ready
Mix Co. v. Creed, 653 S.W.2d 79; 82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983); Hunsley v. Glard, 87 Wash. 2d
424, 428, 553 P.2d 1096, 1099 (1976). However, other jurisdictions have refused to adopt the
Dillon approach. Some have applied the "zone of danger" rule, see, e.g., Rickey v. Chicago
Transit Auth. 101 IlM. App. 3d 439, 442, 428 N.E.2d 596, 598-99 (1981), af'd, 98 11. 2d 546,
457 N.E.2d 1 (1983); Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552, 555 (Minn. 1980); Bovsun v. Sanperi,
61 N.Y.2d 219, 230-31, 461 N.E.2d 843, 848-49, 472 N.Y.S.2d 357, 361"(1984); while others
have continued to adhere to the "impact" rule, see, e.g., Peacock v. General Motors Accept-
ance Corp., 432 So. 2d 142, 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Hamilton v. Powell, Goldstein,
Frazer & Murphy, 252 Ga. 149, 150, 311 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1984); Little v. Williamson, 441
N.E.2d 974, 975 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
74 See, e.g., Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 1981) (foreseeability approach
considered seriousness of emotional distress inflicted on a reasonable person); Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 568-69, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1302 (1978) (plaintiff must have either
experienced accident personally or have come upon scene of accident soon after occurrence);
see also Keck v. Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 115, 593 P.2d 668, 669 (1979) (dual test applying
both zone of harm and physical manifestation of psychic harm).
71 See, e.g., Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc., 400 So. 2d 369, 374 (Ala. 1981);
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 826, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831,
837 (1980); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970); Paugh v.
Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 79, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 172-73,
404 A.2d 672, 686 (1979).
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ing the validity of a claim for psychic harm.76 Indeed, many have
concluded that proof of physical injury may not always be a good
indication of the severity of the harm suffered.77
Although these courts have focused primarily on the appropri-
ateness of applying traditional negligence theory to deal with
problems of unlimited liability, they also have recognized the
problems inherent in permitting recovery for psychic harm. In an
effort to define and limit liability, and to forestall the possibility of
an abundance of trivial claims, these courts have imposed three
requirements: (1) that the harm be serious; (2) that the incident
giving rise to the harm be sufficient to cause serious psychic harm
in a person "normally constituted"; and (3) that the harm be a
reasonably foreseeable result of the tortious activity.78 Obviously,
the first and second requirements are not part of traditional negli-
gence theory. However, as will be shown in a later section of this
Article, they address legitimate concerns and serve to limit liability
in a rational, rather than arbitrary manner, and are therefore, pref-
erable to a zone of danger or physical injury approach.7 9
Although the jurisdictions recognizing a "no strings attached"
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress have
7' See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 927-28, 616 P.2d 813, 820-21, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831, 838 (1980); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 519-21
(1970); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 154, 404 A.2d 672, 676 (1979).
77 See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 927-28, 616 P.2d 813, 820, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831, 838 (1980). In Molien, the plaintiff's wife was negligently examined by one of
the defendant's staff physicians and subsequently diagnosed as having an infectious strain
of syphilis. Id. at 919, 616 P.2d at 814, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 832. As a result, she became suspi-
cious that her husband had engaged in extra-marital affairs, which led to rising marital
tensions and an ultimate end to the marriage. Id. at 920, 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal. Rptr.
at 832-33. Mr. Molien brought suit against the defendant, alleging that the staff physician's
tortious conduct was directed at him as well as at his wife. Id., 616 P.2d at 814-15, 167 Cal.
Rptr. at 832-33. The issue before the court was whether the plaintiff was barred from recov-
ery for the mental distress suffered because there was no corresponding physical injury. Id.
at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
The Molien court noted that the border between physical and emotional injury could
not easily be delineated, and that the question of injury, physical or emotional, was merely
one of proof that should be left to the trier of fact. Id. at 929-30, 616 P.2d at 820-21, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 838-39. In addition, the court held that advances in modern psychology would
both enable the factfinder to establish with greater certainty the genuineness of emotional
injury and prevent the institution of a multitude of frivolous claims. Id. at 930, 616 P.2d at
821, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 839.
7' See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 170-75, 472 P.2d 509, 519-21 (1970); Paugh v.
Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 79, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765-66 (1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 173,
404 A.2d 672, 686 (1979).
70 See infra notes 133 to 159 and accompanying text.
1985]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
brought the interest in psychic equilibrium much closer to inde-
pendence, it is clear that recognition of a cause of action is still
dependent on a showing that the invasion was the result of negli-
gence.80 Thus, the focus is often on the applicability of negligence
principles in solving problems of over-extended liability. There is
little indication in these cases that the interest has gained indepen-
dence to the point that it would be protected regardless of the the-
ory of the plaintiff's case.
4. Recovery for Psychic Harm in Traditional Strict Liability
Most judicial and scholarly attention given the interest in
psychic equilibrium has occurred in the context of negligence or
intentional tort. However, there are other avenues to explore.
Whether courts have awarded damages for psychic harm in tradi-
tional strict liability cases is a relevant inquiry in determining
whether strict liability in tort should be imposed for psychic harm
in a modern products liability case. Although an affirmative finding
does not necessarily mean that such awards are appropriate in a
strict products liability context, it does provide some support for
the proposition that recovery for psychic harm is not alien to a
strict liability theory.
Until the recent explosion in products liability, tort recoveries
based on a theory of strict liability had been limited to a few
clearly defined areas. These include liability for personal injuries
or property damage caused by wild or vicious animals, by ul-
trahazardous activities, or through tortious breach of implied war-
ranty.8' Although traditional strict liability theory has only rarely
been applied to psychic injuries, there is some indication that dam-
ages for fright caused by vicious or wild animals may be recovered
in the absence of physical injury.8 2 Similarly, cases in which courts
80 See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 927-28, 616 P.2d 813, 819-20, 167
Cal. Rptr. 831, 837-38 (1980); Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 170, 472 P.2d 509, 519
(1970).
81 See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 14.1 (1956); W. PROSSER & W. KEE-
TON, supra note 8, § 75.
82 See Candler v. Smith, 50 Ga. App. 667, 673, 179 S.E. 395, 399 (1935); Netusil v.
Novak, 120 Neb. 751, 754, 235 N.W. 335, 337 (1931). In Netusil, the court held that a defen-
dant who knew of his dog's propensity for viciousness was strictly liable for the plaintiff's
nervous prostration caused when the dog attacked her, even though she suffered no physical
injury. 120 Neb. at 755, 235 N.W. at 337. In Candler, the plaintiff was allowed to recover for
nervous shock caused by the defendant's wild baboon, which had escaped from the defen-
dant's yard. 50 Ga. App. at 672-73, 179 S.E. at 398-99. The Candler court noted, however,
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have imposed strict liability for conducting an ultrahazardous ac-
tivity (usually blasting) offer some authority for the proposition
that damages for psychic harm are recoverable in strict liability.
8 3
Such damages have also been awarded in contaminated food cases,
when the plaintiff has claimed tortious breach of implied war-
ranty.814 Although these cases themselves do not justify full-scale
protection of the interest in psychic equilibrium in a strict liability
context, they do indicate that some courts are willing to protect
the interest in such a setting.
D. Conclusion: A Plea for Independence
It is clear from the foregoing that despite the progress that the
interest in psychic equilibrium has made in attaining recognition,
it continues to be tied to the moral culpability of the defendant.
To make moral culpability a prerequisite to recovery, however, ap-
pears to question the importance of the interest itself rather than
the need to assure the valid4ty of the claim.8 5 To tie awards for
psychic harm to the degree of the defendant's culpability overlooks
the inescapable fact that the nature and extent of the defendant's
fault bears no relationship whatsoever to the nature and extent of
the plaintiff's harm. If an interest is recognized as worthy of pro-
tection, the emphasis should be on the nature and extent of the
harm to the plaintiff, not on either the theory of recovery or the
character of the defendant's tortious behavior. Thus, if a societal
interest is advanced by holding the defendant "accountable" for
the plaintiff's psychic harm, the plaintiff should recover regardless
of whether the defendant may be deemed "culpable."
that, as a general rule, psychic injury, to be recoverable, must be accompanied by some
physical manifestation. Id. at 673, 179 S.E. at 399.
83 See Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal. App. 2d 778, -789, 214 P.2d 50, 58 (1950); Gulatt v.
Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 243 So. 2d 820, 827 (La. Ct. App. 1971); Halpert v. Ingram &
Greene, Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 872, 873, 333 N.Y.S.2d 913, 914 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1972).
4 See, e.g., Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 443, 420 P.2d
855, 859 (1967).
85 Tort law often accounts for "moral culpability" in determining damages by allowing
awards of punitive damages when the defendant's behavior has been particularly egregious.
See Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1258, 1265
(1976). However, an important goal of tort law is to provide compensation for those whose
legally protected interests have been invaded by another's socially unacceptable behavior.
See W. PROSSER & W. KEErTON, supra note 8, at 5-6.
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III. RECOVERY FOR PSYCHIC HARM UNDER A THEORY OF STRICT
PRIDUCTS LIABILITY
Once the value of the interest in psychic equilibrium is ac-
cepted as independent and unattached to a particular theory of
action, it should be afforded full protection, unless serious obsta-
cles exist. In strict products liability, the potentially serious obsta-
cles are the recurring problems of unlimited liability and the po-
tential strain on the judicial system. The appropriate method for
defining the extent of liability in strict products liability has been
a controversial subject even when psychic harm has not been an
issue.8 6 The addition of a psychic harm dimension further compli-
cates this already confused area.
A. History and Background
The explosion of products liability and its overnight transition
from a negligence and warranty cause of action to a claim covered
by an independent legal theory has been so well documented, and
so often discussed, that another account would be redundant.8 7
Some aspects of its development, however, are relevant to the issue
under consideration here and require at least cursory examination.
In particular, a look at the various social policy rationales used to
justify imposition of strict liability may be relevant to determining
whether recovery of damages for psychic harm is appropriate in
strict products liability. Further, it may be helpful to focus on the
nature of strict products liability to decide which method of limit-
ing liability is appropriate. It is sufficient for present purposes to
note that Justice Traynor's bold assertion in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products,"8 that "[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort
when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be
used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that
" See Maleson, supra note 8, at 16-17. Courts have tended to use the familiar concept
of foreseeability to limit liability in strict products liability, but this propensity has been
sharply criticized. See Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept and Strict Products Liability:
The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RUTGERS L.J. 101, 113 (1976).
87 See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, at §§ 95A-99; Franklin, When
Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L
REV. 974, 975-90 (1966); Prosser, supra note 6, at 791-805; Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099-1103, 1124-34 (1960);
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L.
REv. 363, 363-79 (1965); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
Miss. L.J. 825, 825-27 (1973).
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
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causes injury to a human being,"' 9 was endorsed by the American
Law Institute in its adoption of Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.90 Subsequently, the vast majority of American
jurisdictions has embraced some form of strict liability in tort for
injuries caused by defective products.91 The problems of defining
the scope of strict products liability and the vast increase in prod-
uct-related litigation in the last two decades have been a source of
consternation and considerable concern to courts92 and commenta-
tors93 alike. Indeed, widespread dissatisfaction with the way strict
products liability has functioned in actual practice has led to a re-
assessment of whether strict liability should be imposed at all in
design defect and "duty to warn" cases.94
The current debate over whether strict liability should be im-
posed in products cases, although certainly relevant in any discus-
sion of strict products liability, is not precisely within the scope of
this Article. However, it is essential at the outset of this discussion
to distinguish between the need to reevaluate products liability
and the need to protect the interest in psychic equilibrium. There
is a danger that concern over extension of strict liability in the
products liability area will result in a backlash against the physi-
cally harmed plaintiff. Thus, if the boundaries of strict products
liability need to be delineated more clearly, then these boundaries
should be reexamined and redefined. The problems with respect to
products liability will not be rationally or appropriately solved by
89 Id. at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
"o See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
91 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
912 See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 849 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
" See, e.g., Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat? A Response to the Product Lia-
bility Crisis, 14 FORUM 251, 252-53 (1978) (increases in number of cases and size of awards
created "crisis" in field of products liability); Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for
the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV. 643, 643 (1978) (doctrinal changes have been source of
both enthusiasm and confusion); Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturer's Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM L. REv. 1531, 1531 (1973) (courts
incapable of setting necessary standards for product safety); Twerski, From Defect to Cause
to Comparative Fault-Rethinking Some Product Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV.
297, 301 (1976) (confusion and inconsistency among courts interpreting strict liability
doctrine).
"4 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LiABmrrY:
FINAL REPORT VII-19 to VII-20 (1977) (application of strict liability to "design" and "duty
to warn" cases is unsound); Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979)
(strict liability should not apply to "design" and "duty to warn" cases); Henderson, Manu-
facturers' Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.CL.
REV. 625, 634-35 (1978) (proposal to eliminate strict liability in "design" cases).
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singling out and denying recovery to a plaintiff who has suffered a
serious injury to an important interest.
B. Policies Underlying Strict Products Liability and Recoveries
for Psychic Harm
The recognition of psychic equilibrium as an interest worthy
of independent protection does not necessarily transform manufac-
turers into insurers of consumers' psychic equilibrium. When a
psychic injury occurs, there may be a number of reasons for not
imposing liability-the injury may be purely accidental, so that no
reason can be found for shifting the loss away from the injured
party, or the plaintiff's interest in being free from psychic harm
may be outweighed by policies favoring the defendant's interests in
being free of liability. Under a negligence theory, imposition of lia-
bility is justified, to a large extent, by the collective sentiment of
society that the defendant's substandard behavior is tulpable. 95 If,
for reasons of sound social policy, society has deemed that liability
for the creation of certain kinds of risks should be imposed even if
the plaintiff cannot make a showing of "fault" in the traditional
sense, it is necessary to establish that those social policies are ad-
vanced by the imposition of liability. Therefore, to determine
whether the interest in psychic equilibrium should be protected in
strict products liability, it is necessary, first, to identify the policy
rationales that have been propounded as justification for imposing
strict products liability, and, second, to determine whether recov-
ery for psychic harm comports with those policies.
The policies underlying the imposition of strict liability in tort
for product-related injuries have been variously stated,96 restated,97
11 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.1 (1965); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 8, § 31, at 169.
See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962) (products liability insures that costs of injuries resulting from
defective products are borne by manufacturer); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d
453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (public policy demands respon-
sibility for injuries be fixed wherever it most effectively reduces number of defective prod-
ucts); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A and comment c (1965) (public policy de-
mands that burden of accidental injuries caused by defective product be placed on seller).
97 See, e.g., Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077,
1086-92 (1965) (producers who throw risk of loss on others shall pay for loss incurred);
Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liabil-
ity for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 809-10 (1976) (compensation of inadequately
protected consumer for injuries caused by defective product is cost of doing business);
Wade, supra note 87, at 826 (product safety increased where manufacturer held liable for
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and rethought. 8 Although numerous formulations of these ratio-
nales are possible, the following statement of policies fairly charac-
terizes those traditionally advanced as justifying imposition of
strict products liability:
(1) Manufacturers convey to the public a general sense of product
quality through the use of mass advertising and merchandising
practices, causing consumers to rely for their protection upon the
skill and expertise of the manufacturing community.
(2) Consumers no longer have the ability to protect themselves
adequately from defective products due to the vast number and
complexity of products which must be "consumed" in order to
function in modern society.
(3) Sellers are often in a better position than consumers to iden-
tify the potential product risks, to determine the acceptable levels
of such risks, and to confine the risks within those levels.
(4) A majority of product accidents not caused by product abuse
are probably attributable to the negligent acts or omissions of
manufacturers at some stage of the manufacturing or marketing
process, yet the difficulties of discovering and proving this negli-
gence are often practicably insurmountable.
(5) Negligence liability is generally insufficient to induce manu-
facturers to market adequately safe products.
(6) Sellers almost invariably are in a better position than consum-
ers to absorb or spread the costs of product accidents.
(7) The costs of injuries flowing from typical risks inherent in
products can fairly be put upon the enterprises marketing the
products as a cost of their doing business, thus assuring that
these enterprises will fully "pay their way" in the society from
which they derive their profits.9
With the caveat that these rationales may have shortcom-
ings, 10 0 this Article will proceed on the assumption that these so-
cial policy rationales remain the legitimate foundation underlying
defects).
18 See Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681,
683-84 (1980).
19 See Montgomery & Owen, supra note 97, at 809-10.
100 See Epstein, supra note 93, at 658-60; Owen, supra note 98, at 703-14. Implicit in
the restatement of these rationales is an assumption that they accurately and adequately
express the policies that provide a foundation for the premise that imposition of strict tort
liability is appropriate in products liability cases. However the legitimacy of this assumption
and the effectiveness of traditional rationales as decisionmaking tools for courts in the prod-
ucts liability area recently have been seriously questioned. See Epstein, supra note 93, at
658-60; Owen, supra note 98, at 703-14. However, no clearly defined substitute rationale has
been recognized, and these are the policies with which courts are still working.
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strict products liability. The primary focus of this Article will be
on the relationship of each policy rationale to recoveries for
psychic harm, and whether such recoveries serve (or at least do not
disserve) the expressed policies. The conclusion is, if each rationale
is generally sound, it is no less sound as applied specifically to re-
coveries for psychic harm.
The first rationale may be termed either the implied represen-
tation of safety or the consumer expectation policy for imposing
strict liability.10 1 Obviously, a product which the manufacturer has
implied is safe, and which the consumer expects to be safe, is not
safe if it is defective and causes harm. Whether that harm is
psychic or otherwise is irrelevant to the issue of whether the manu-
facturer has raised an expectation of product safety in the con-
sumer. The general sense of product quality that the manufacturer
conveys and that the consumer expects, exists regardless of the na-
ture of the untoward consequence. The question is what protection
the law will afford a consumer injured by the defective product.
This question is not answered by inquiring whether the consumer
expected only some of his interests to be free from invasion by a
defect in the product. It is sufficient to say that the consumer ex-
pected the product to be safe because the manufacturer implied it
was safe. If it caused harm, either physical or psychic, it was not
safe.
The second rationale expresses the sentiment that strict prod-
ucts liability is justified by the vast proliferation of products and
the consumer's resulting inability to inspect them or protect him-
self against them. As with the first rationale, the nature of the
harm is irrelevant to the issue of whether this is a legitimate rea-
son for imposing strict liability. Just as an extremely complicated
machine can run amuck and cause physical injury, it can run
amuck and put one in fear of suffering such injury. That it was the
latter and not the former harm that actually occurred in a particu-
lar case has no bearing on whether consumers are unable to protect
themselves from the vast array of complicated products that exists
today.
The third rationale focuses on the superior resources and ex-
pertise for risk identification that manufacturers potentially pos-
101 See Owen, supra note 98, at 707. For a detailed discussion of the representational
theory, see Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function
and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974).
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sess. Whether recovery for psychic harm comports with this policy
depends upon how narrowly or broadly the risk to be identified
and assessed by the seller is defined. If identifying the risk means
that the defendant must be in a position to realize that a particu-
lar product defect will cause psychic harm, recovery for such harm
may not comport with this policy because psychic harm may not
be the kind of injury that would ordinarily result from an accident
involving the product. On the other hand, if identifying the risk
merely means that manufacturers should realize that a defect in
the product can cause an invasion of a legally protected interest,
then the character of the actual harm that results-whether physi-
cal or psychic-should be irrelevant. Thus, with this rationale, the
real question is how to define the scope of liability in strict prod-
ucts liability. From a policy standpoint, regardless of the definition
of risk, it appears that the manufacturer is generally in a better
position than the consumer to control the risk and, under this ap-
proach, should be responsible for any harm caused by the product.
Risk management is directed toward eliminating generalized risk
of injury or managing those that cannot be eliminated. If liability
is not imposed for psychic harm under this rationale, it is not be-
cause the manufacturer is not in a better position than the con-
sumer to recognize and manage the risk through quality control; it
is because other policy considerations have been employed to force
the conclusion that the manufacturer should not be liable for
psychic harm.
If the premise of the fourth policy-that most product acci-
dents are a result of the manufacturer's negligence-is generally
sound, there is no reason to deny recovery for psychic harm. Under
such a theory, since strict products liability would simply be manu-
facturer negligence that the plaintiff did not have to prove, the
same justifications for allowing awards for psychic harm in a negli-
gence cause of action would apply.
The fifth rationale emphasizes the deterrent effect that impo-
sition of strict products liability will have on manufacturers. This
approach suggests that the desired goal of strict products liability
is to create an incentive to manufacturers to produce safe prod-
ucts, a goal that is in no way furthered by excluding damages for
psychic injury. If the unsafe character of a product causes serious
psychic harm, it is just as unsafe as if it had caused bodily harm.
Thus, awards for psychic harm would serve as an inducement to
create safe products.
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The sixth justification assumes that suppliers of products are
better equipped than consumers to absorb or spread losses. If this
assumption is well founded, the manufacturer should pay for the
product-related loss regardless of its character. A problem with
this assumption that may bear upon recoveries for psychic harm is
that a manufacturer who is currently better able than a consumer
to absorb or insure against loss may not be in such a position for
long if he must pay for every product-related injury, no matter
how remotely connected to the product. A requirement of bodily
injury has some built-in liability limitations simply because the in-
jurious effects of a defective product can spread only so far. How-
ever, the spectre of a defective product malfunctioning in such a
way as to cause psychic damage to a television viewing audience of
millions looms large in the minds of those who would deny recov-
ery. What is called for here, however, is not the rejection of all
claims of psychic injury, but rather a workable method for limiting
liability, once it is established that good reason for limiting liabil-
ity exists.
The seventh justification states an enterprise liability ap-
proach to strict products liability and calls for an economic analy-
sis. Stated in simple terms, the losses to society created by an en-
terprise should, for economic reasons, be borne by that enterprise.
Given the natural desire to allocate limited resources efficiently,
and the need to know the true cost of everything in the market-
place, the cost of potential injuries will be included in the price for
which products are sold. According to an enterprise liability the-
ory, if the product caused the injury, the loss should be sustained
by the manufacturer. 102 The resulting cost may then be added to
the price of the product, and the selling price will more accurately
reflect its true cost.103 If the cost is too high, it will exceed the
amount consumers are willing to pay, and the law of supply and
demand will provide a check on further increases. In order for an
enterprise liability theory to work, however, the costs should be
actual costs-out of pocket expenses for doctors, medication, hos-
pitalization, and lost wages. Since a refusal to permit a recovery for
psychic harm would subvert an enterprise liability approach to
102 For discussion of enterprise liability and economic approach to tort liability, see
generally Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1056-57 (1972); Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L.
REv. 153, 175-229 (1976).
"I See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, § 98, at 692-93.
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strict products liability, psychic harm should be compensable
under enterprise liability if it results in actual monetary losses to
the plaintiff.
Naturally enough, the policies justifying strict products liabil-
ity in situations that previously would have required a showing of
negligence bespeak a distinct leniency toward consumers seeking
redress for product-related injuries. Though these policies in no
way indicate a need to deny recovery for psychic harm, discerning
in them a desire to protect the American consumer by providing
more expansive avenues for recovery only begins the inquiry.
C. Defining the Scope of Liability for Psychic Harm in Strict
Products Liability
Courts will not be convinced that the interest in psychic equi-
librium should be protected in strict products liability cases with-
out some assurance that the extent of liability can be defined in a
way that avoids imposition of unfair burdens on manufacturers. As
the interest in psychic equilibrium has evolved toward indepen-
dent recognition, a primary concern of the courts has been the
problem of indefinite and potentially unlimited liability.110 This
section of the Article will address the problem of defining the
scope of liability in a strict products liability setting with the aim
of establishing that, with an appropriate liability-limiting device,
courts will be able to protect the interest in psychic equilibrium
invaded by a defective product.
Much of the difficulty with the area of strict products liability
in general, and with finding a workable liability defining device in
particular, result from section 402A of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts and its commentary. The adoption of section 402A by the
American Law Institute marked a distinct doctrinal shift in the
approach to product injury cases.105 The focus of attention shifted
from the conduct that had brought about an unreasonably danger-
ous condition (defendant's negligence), to the defective condition
of the product, which made it unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer (section 402A Liability). Although section 402A does
not specifically label the brand of liability it created, comment "a"
'0 See, e.g., supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text; Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d
609, 615-16, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422-23, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558-59 (1969).
105 See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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states unequivocally that "[tihe rule is one of strict liability."' 0'
The use of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" to modify the
term "defect," however, demonstrates that the language of section
402A sounds in both negligence and strict liability.107 Moreover,
though much of the commentary stresses the strict and enterprise
liability aspects of section 402A, the standard stated in comment
"j," relating to the necessity for directions or warnings, is clearly a
negligence standard.'08 In addition, the smorgasbord approach to
the policies underlying strict products liability'09 exacerbates the
sense of doctrinal mystery that surrounds this section. Provided
with these conflicting standards, and with little else to guide them,
the courts began the difficult task of applying the newly created
doctrine to individual cases arising before them. It is not surprising
that courts, unsure of which doctrine to apply, have relied on the
108 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment a (1965). Comment a pro-
vides in pertinent part:
a. This Section states a special rule applicable to sellers of products. The rule
is one of strict liability, making the seller subject to liability to the user or con-
sumer even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
the product. The Section is inserted in the Chapter dealing with the negligence
liability of suppliers of chattels, for convenience of reference and comparison with
other Sections dealing with negligence. The rule stated here is not exclusive, and
does not preclude liability based upon the alternative ground of negligence of the
seller, where such negligence can be proved.
Id.
107 Id. § 402A(1).
108 Id. § 402A comment j;
• ..Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial
number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is
not generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably not
expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he
has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger.
Likewise in the case of poisonous drugs, or those unduly dangerous for other rea-
sons, warning as to use may be required.
Id. comment i.
109 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461-62, 150 P.2d 436,
440-41 (1944); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
In Greenman, the plaintiff was injured while operating a power tool manufactured by
the defendant. 59 Cal. 2d at 59, 377 P.2d at 896, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 698. The court held the
manufacturer strictly liable for the plaintiff's injuries since the manufacturer knew that the
product was to be used without having first been inspected for defects. Id. at 62-63, 377
P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01.
In Escola, however, the manufacturer of a defective soda bottle was held liable, not
under a strict liability theory, but under a theory of negligence. 24 Cal. 2d at 461-62, 150
P.2d at 440.
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familiar vernacular of negligence law, and, in particular, on the
concept of foreseeability. 110 It has been suggested however, that al-
though foreseeability is an appropriate and effective method for
limiting liability in negligence cases, it may be doctrinally inconsis-
tent with the strict liability aspects of products liability.-" In neg-
ligence, the concept of foreseeability is directly tied to the notion
of the defendant's culpability. A defendant is liable for only those
harms caused by his conduct which he should have foreseen. Strict
products liability is imposed however, not because the defendant's
conduct was substandard, but because society has concluded that
the furtherance of certain policies justifies the imposition of liabil-
ity without regard to fault. Therefore, the use of foreseeability as a
method for limiting liability has no integral place in a case based
on strict liability. It cannot be denied that the section 402A brand
of strict products liability has strong negligence overtones, but
much doctrinal confusion could be avoided by using liability defin-
ing devices that are not directly tied to a particular legal theory.
Although the doctrinal and policy underpinnings of strict
products liability are many and varied, a common thread running
through all the articulated policies is that the time has come for
those marketing defective products to assume responsibility for in-
juries caused by such products. As the commentary to section 402A
states, "the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum
of protection at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to
afford it are those who market the products.""' 2 If "maximum pro-
tection" means protection for all independently cognizable inter-
ests of consumers who have been harmed by a defective product,
psychic harm is within the formula. If this expansive view is ac-
cepted at face value however, questions such as "what kind of
harm?" and "suffered by whom?" are still legitimate and quite
pressing in individual cases. Any device used to define liability
must be one that will extend liability in a manner that would both
serve the expansive purpose of strict products liability and protect
the interest in psychic equilibrium. Any limits imposed on liability
110 See, e.g., Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 737 F.2d 462, 465-66 (5th Cir.
1984) (injured party need show only that injury would be reasonably foreseeable to one
knowing of defect in product); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536 (D.C.
Cir.) (manufacturer has duty to warn of foreseeable dangers), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 545
(1984).
'" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
1,2 See Maleson, supra note 8, at 11-12.
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must be definite enough to permit a sufficiently wide range of
choice of action so that manufacturers can engage in profitable en-
terprise without potentially disastrous liability. At the same time,
these restrictions must permit consumers injured by defective
products to have a fairly clear idea of when to seek compensatory
relief from the manufacturer.
1. Risk Analysis
One possible way to limit appropriately liability is to employ a
generalized risk analysis adapted to the context of strict products
liability. Risk analysis has been exhaustively explored and exten-
sively extolled as a method for defining the scope of liability in tort
cases. 113 Proponents of risk analysis have advanced it as an alter-
native to "proximate cause" in negligence law 114 and as a tool for
determining the extent of liability in both traditional strict liabil-
ity 115 and strict products liability cases. 116
There are a number of variations on the theme of risk analy-
sis, but its basic premise is that "the scope of liability should be
commensurate with the basis of liability.1 1 17 In negligence, the ba-
sis of liability is substandard conduct," 8 in traditional strict liabil-
ity, it is the creation of a risk through the performance of a partic-
ularly dangerous activity," 9 and in strict products liability it is the
dissemination of a dangerously defective product. 20 Because each
of these involves the creation of a risk that will result in liability if
113 See, e.g., R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1963); Birnbaum, Un-
masking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence to Warranty to Strict Liability to
Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 602-18 (1980); Epstein, supra note 93, at 650-62; Seavey,
Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 CoLUM. L. REV. 20, 29-41 (1939); Note, The
Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1031 (1928).
114 See R. KEETON, supra note 113, at 17, 127 n.16; Smith, supra note 20, at 265-67;
Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Func-
tions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 1, 22-33.
15 See, e.g., R. KEETON, supra note 113, at 103-08; Birnbaum, supra note 113, at 631-
36; Donaher, Piehler, Twerski & Weinstein, The Technological Expert in Products Liability
Litigation, 52 TEX. L. REV. 1303, 1307-09 (1974); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler,
Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From Quality to Process Standards, 55 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 347, 355-57 (1980).
Ile R. KEETON, supra note 113; at 108-15. Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A
and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REv. 1185, 1189 (1976); Maleson, supra note 8,
at 16-20.
17 R. KEETON, supra note 113, at 19.
'18 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, § 43, at 297.
119 See id. § 75, at 537.
2o See id. § 95, at 677-79.
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injury occurs, risk analysis is theoretically applicable to all three.
Although legal scholars have long praised risk analysis as a
workable method for determining tort liability,12' it has not been
widely used by courts. 22 In the context of strict products liability
this factor may enhance its applicability because, unlike the notion
of foreseeability, it has not been closely identified with any partic-
ular area of tort law. Thus, it is less likely that negligence-based
reasoning will invade the court's holding and engender the doctri-
nal confusion that has been a major concern of commentators.'23
Rather than focusing on the defendant's behavior, risk analysis ex-
amines the risk created, the harm suffered, and the fairness of
holding the risk creator liable. 24
The critical question is how risk analysis would operate in a
strict products liability case in which the plaintiff suffered psychic
harm. A controversial area in risk analysis generally is the question
of whether it should be the judge or the jury who decides if a par-
ticular result was within the scope of the risk created. 25 Those
who favor having the judge decide stress that the policy aspects
involved lead to a determination of whether there was a duty,
which is traditionally a judicial function.12 6 Those favoring the jury
1' See R. KEErON, supra note 113, at 18-19; Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151, 159-60 (1973); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 537, 544 (1972).
122 See Maleson, supra note 8, at 18; Page, Generic Products Risks: The Case Against
Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 853, 874 (1983). Professor Page
suggests that courts have rejected risk analysis because they are hesitant to adopt radical
changes and are of the opinion that the matter requires legislative action. Id. A notable
exception is Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162
N.E. 99 (1928).
123 See Maleson, supra note 8, at 18 (risk analysis avoids ambiguity by focusing on
court's definitions of duty and risk).
12' See id. Risk analysis involves a determination of whether the risk is unreasonable by
balancing the probability and seriousness of harm against the expense of safety precautions.
See Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 935 (8th Cir. 1976); Welch v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254-55 (5th Cir. 1973); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485,
492-93, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (1974). This type of determination permits an objective eval-
uation of the costs and benefits imposed on society by production of the product. See Mont-
gomery & Owen, supra note 97, at 844.
125 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 93, at 1540-42 (jury unsuited to task of determining
scope of products liability); Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An
Interaction of Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. Rav. 425, 440-41, 458-59 (1974) (judge prop-
erly equipped to make technical determinations). But see R. KEEroN, supra note 113, at 49-
60 (determination of risk is fact-oriented, requiring evaluative judgement with respect to the
facts).
12 See Note, supra note 113, at 1023-25. Proponents of duty-risk analysis contend that
the judge should determine whether a duty was owed. Id. This allows for clear articulation
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making the decision claim that the determination of the scope of
the risk requires an evaluative finding based on the facts.'27 Al-
though duty may be an aspect of a strict products liability case, it
is a generalized duty imposed by law to avoid disseminating dan-
gerously defective products, not a particularized duty to avoid con-
duct which creates a foreseeable risk of harm. Thus, it leaves little
room for the policy considerations found in negligence determina-
tions of a precisely stated duty of care. If the judge were to decide
the scope of the risk as a duty question in strict products liability,
the nature of the action would be distorted.
Regardless of whether the judge or jury is making the determi-
nation however, the most critical factor in the use of risk analysis
is how to define the concept of risk and how to advise those
charged with determining its scope. As one leading proponent of
risk analysis has noted:
In the area of products liability, this question of the scope of
the risk on the basis of which the conduct or activity is deter-
mined to be tortious is intimately associated with the concept of
defectiveness of the product. That is, the liability of the manufac-
turer or supplier is ordinarily based on the conclusion that the
product is in some way defective; and the scope of liability ex-
tends only to those injuries that arise out of the defect. 2
If the scope of the risk extends to injuries that are caused by the
defect in the product, what is the result in cases in which the de-
fect has caused the plaintiff to suffer psychic harm?
As a starting point in defining risk, it is fair to say that the
risk in strict products liability is that dangerously defective prod-
ucts will cause injury to legally protected interests. 1 9 If the inter-
est in psychic equilibrium is a legally protected interest, then an
invasion of it by a defective product must be within the scope of
the risk. Thus, as a first step, the judge should make it clear to the
jury that the interest in psychic harm is one that the law protects
from invasions caused by defective products. Once this is accepted,
of policy, thereby preventing the judge from relying on the ambiguous verbal formulations
inherent in proximate cause analysis. See Maleson, supra note 8, at 18-19.
127 See R. Ka'oN, supra note 113, at 49 (risk rule is heavily dependent on interpreta-
tion of facts); Vandall, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and
Strict Liability, 43 OHio ST. L.J. 61, 85 (1982) (jury should weigh appropriateness of loss-
shifting).
128 R. KEETON, supra note 113, at 108-09.
19 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 8, § 95, at 677-79.
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if the plaintiff's psychic harm occurs as a result of the defective
product causing fear for his own safety, it is not difficult to accept
that such psychic harm is within the scope of the risk. More diffi-
cult issues arise if the plaintiff's psychic harm is a result of another
person's contact with the defective product. The question is
whether, in a generalized risk analysis, there is any effective way to
limit liability. In other words, what happens if the nature of the
harm suffered is not the kind of harm ordinarily caused or even
likely to be caused by the defect in the product?
One approach is to have the jury decide the largely factual de-
terminations of whether the product is defective, whether the
plaintiff actually suffered psychic harm, and whether the defect
caused, or was a substantial factor in causing, the psychic harm.
Theoretically, in a pure risk analysis approach, these are the only
determinations that need to be made. Certainly this approach
would provide the broadest possible protection to the interest in
psychic equilibrium and satisfy the most expansive policy objec-
tives of strict products liability. However, it would no doubt hor-
rify those who fear the worst in terms of limitless liability and a
flood of litigation.
Another possibility is to introduce an aspect of "foreseeabil-
ity" to the scope of the risk question without using the word "fore-
seeability." There is, after all, considerable authority for the pro-
position that some "foreseeable" danger is involved anytime
liability is imposed for the creation of risks.130 Thus, in a risk anal-
ysis approach, there could be an added component calling for the
jury's evaluative judgment in light of the harm suffered, the *class
of the plaintiff, and the situation giving rise to the harm. For ex-
ample, the judge might inquire whether the jury would find that a
person in the plaintiff's position, and under the circumstances cre-
ated by the defective product, would be likely to suffer psychic
harm. In making this determination the jury could consider factors
such as the plaintiff's proximity to the incident; whether plaintiff
was using the product at the time of the incident; and the plain-
tiff's relationship and proximity to another person injured by the
product. An alternative that sounds slightly less like a "foreseeabil-
ity" approach is to ask whether the psychic harm suffered by the
130 See, e.g., Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 12 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartique v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963);
Gelusumio v. E.W. Bliss Co., 10 IlM. App. 3d 604, 607, 295 N.E.2d 110, 112 (1973); see also F.
HARPER & F. JA~ms, supra note 81, § 14.7; R. KEETON, supra, note 113, at 41-45.
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plaintiff was so atypical in light of the circumstances of the case as
to withdraw it from the scope of the risk created by the product
defect.13 1
Although an inquiry based on the possible occurrence of an
event might serve to allay the fears of those haunted by the spectre
of unlimited liability and a flood of litigation, it smacks of a negli-
gence foreseeability analysis inconsistent with strict products lia-
bility and arguably at odds with both risk analysis as a determiner
of liability and with recognition of psychic equilibrium as an inde-
pendent legal interest. If the scope of the risk in strict products
liability is injury caused to any legally protected interest by a dan-
gerously defective product, it should not matter how unlikely or
atypical the harm was under the circumstances. If the defect in the
product caused a damaging invasion of the legally protected inter-
est, or, in risk analysis terms, if the harm complained of fell within
the scope of the risk created, then the plaintiff should recover.
Given the broad policy objectives of strict products liability and
the need to recognize psychic harm as an independent interest, the
fact that the scope of liability may be broad should not be alarm-
ing. Unfortunately, in light of the current concerns associated with
both the explosion of strict products liability and the potential for
false or trivial claims'82 in an area such as psychic harm in which
objective symptomatology is often lacking, it is probably unrealis-
tic to expect that a pure risk analysis will be widely accepted with-
out some restraint on the potential for runaway liability.
What is needed is a method for limiting liability that will sat-
isfactorily accommodate all of the interests involved without dilut-
ing the doctrinal and policy foundations of strict products liability.
One solution to this perplexing problem would be the imposition of
one or more carefully defined, practical, external liability-limiters.
These would be outside the legal theory of the case and would pro-
vide for the use of a liability-defining device consistent with strict
products liability while appeasing those fearful of granting psychic
equilibrium full protection.
2. Practical External Limitations on Liability
As a preliminary matter, it is important to distinguish be-
131 Cf. A. EHRENZWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT 63-64 (1951) ("test of general
typicality").
12 See supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
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tween a practical, principled method of limiting liability and a
practical, arbitrary method. 133 As used here, a practical external
liability limiter is one that is unrelated to the theory of the case
and that can be imposed with relative ease by judge or jury to dis-
tinguish between those psychic harm sufferers who should recover
and those who should not. To be practical and principled, the line
must be drawn in a way that takes into account the competing pol-
icies and interests at stake and that makes a reasonable accommo-
dation among them. In a claim for psychic harm, those policies and
interests include the plaintiff's interest in being compensated for
injury to a legally recognized interest, the defendant's interest in
being free from unlimited and indeterminable liability, and the in-
terest of the legal system in the efficient administration of justice.
By contrast, a practical external liability limiter is arbitrary if
it furthers one policy or interest at the expense of another without
full consideration of whether a different rule could be imposed that
would better afford protection to all the interests. It may, for ex-
ample, put undue emphasis on ease of application and insufficient
emphasis on the hard policy questions. A number of "arbitrary"
liability limiting devices, such as the impact requirements, zone of
danger, and physical injury,134 were considered in connection with
the evolution of psychic equilibrium as a protected interest.
The requirement that psychic harm be manifested in physical
symptoms was discussed earlier in connection with the evolution of
the protection afforded psychic equilibrium.135 It must be reconsid-
ered in the context of strict products liability because section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability upon sellers
of defective products "for physical harm . ..caused to the ulti-
mate user or consumer, or to his property.' 1 36 A few courts have
interpreted this to preclude recovery for psychic harm. 3 7
'" For a discussion of arbitrary rules in the context of bystander recovery for psychic
harm, see Pearson, supra note 15, at 478-84.
1- See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
'3 See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
'36 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
"37 See, e.g., Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 101 IlM. App. 3d 439, 440-43, 428 N.E.2d
596, 597-99 (1981), aff'd, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983); WoodiU v. Parke Davis & Co.,
58 I1. App. 3d 349, 355, 374 N.E.2d 683, 687-88 (1978), aff'd, 79 Il1. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194
(1980). But see Wetherill v. University of Chicago, 565 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(recovery for emotional distress in strict liability denied in Woodill only for witnessing in-
jury of another). In Woodill, the parents of a child severely injured in utero after a prescrip-
tion drug was administered to the mother were denied compensation for their emotional
distress in their strict liability action. 58 Ill. App. 3d at 349, 356, 374 N.E.2d at 684-85, 687-
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The physical harm requirement is certainly a "practical" rule
of liability. It is a consideration unrelated to the nature of the
cause of action, with its focus instead on the nature of the injury.
It can be applied with relative ease by judge or jury to eliminate an
entire class of psychic harm sufferers from legal protection, for ex-
ample, those who have no physical symptoms. At one time, before
it was well established that serious psychic harm might occur with-
out physical manifestation, this rule of liability may have been a
reasonable way of approaching liability in psychic harm cases.
However, in light of what is now known about the relationship be-
tween physical symptomatology and psychic injury, 38 the physical
harm requirement must today be considered an arbitrary limita-
tion. Nevertheless, the continued judicial reliance on this require-
ment, in addition to the reference to it in section 402A, suggest
that it must be examined to determine exactly how it should be
construed and applied as a limiting device in strict products liabil-
ity cases.
"Physical harm" as used in section 402A can be interpreted in
several ways. In its most restrictive sense, it can be read to mean
an actual corporeal invasion caused by a defective product, or an
illness caused by contact with or ingestion of a defective prod-
uct.13 9 If this interpretation is accepted, no recovery for psychic
harm would be permitted in strict products liability cases based on
section 402A. Although the direct invasion or contact construction
of "physical harm" has been suggested, 40 contraindications mili-
tate in favor of a broader interpretation. The commentary to sec-
88. The court reasoned that section 402A of the Restatement was designed to compensate
only physical harm in strict liability actions. Id. at 356, 374 N.E.2d at 688. Similarly, in
Rickey, the court held that emotional distress was not a compensable injury under a theory
of strict liability when a minor sought recovery for the anguish caused by seeing his brother
choked and rendered comatose when his clothes became entangled in an escalator. See 101
Ill. App. 3d at 442-43, 428 N.E.2d at 597-99.
138 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 719 (N.D. IM. 1978). In
Mink, women were given DES as part of a medical experiment. Id. One count of the suit
sounded in strict products liability, with the plaintiffs claiming that they suffered severe
mental distress from the increased risk of their children contracting cancer due to the drug.
Id. The court interpreted section 402A of the Restatement as requiring physical injury, and
dismissed the claim of emotional distress as insufficient to support a claim in strict products
liability. Id.
140 Shepard v. Superior Ct., 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 23, 742 Cal. Rptr. 612, 616 (1977)
(Vane, J., dissenting); Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 101 Ill. App. 3d 439, 442, 428 N.E.2d
596, 599 (1981), aff'd, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 453 N.E.2d 1 (1983); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58
Ill. App. 3d 349, 356, 374 N.E.2d 683, 688 (1978).
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tion 402A provides no hint as to how physical harm should be in-
terpreted, however, other sections of the Restatement are more
helpful. Section seven of the Restatement (Second) of Torts de-
fines physical harm as "the physical impairment of the human
body, or of land or chattels. ' 14' No restrictions are given with re-
spect to the cause of the bodily impairment. In addition, the com-
mentary to section 436A, dealing with emotional distress in negli-
gence, indicates that "bodily harm" includes such disorders as
continued nausea and headaches, as well as "repeated hysterical
attacks, or mental aberration," which "may be classified by the
courts as illness, notwithstanding their mental character.' 1 42 Fur-
thermore, the courts have long recognized that physical harm may
result from psychic stimuli, and have interpreted physical harm to
include symptoms that are largely mental, such as nervousness, de-
pression, and hysteria.143 Certainly, the recent recognition of the
interdependence of the mind and body suggests that the term
"physical harm" could be interpreted to include psychic harm, re-
gardless of whether the psychic harm has had physical
manifestations.
It is also possible to consider the section 402A physical harm
requirement satisfied by physical manifestations of psychic harm.
This view suffers the same shortcomings of the physical manifesta-
tion requirement discussed earlier in relation to negligent infliction
of psychic harm. Such an interpretation is particularly untenable
in a jurisdiction in which an enlightened approach to psychic harm
is applied in negligence cases. To require physical symptoms in a
strict products liability case and not in a negligence case would be
patently irrational.
Another interpretation of the physical harm requirement in
section 402A is that the drafters intended to make a distinction
between "physical" harm and "economic" harm rather than a dis-
141 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1965).
142 See id. § 436A comment c (1965).
143 See, e.g., Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 719, 156 A.2d 149, 152 (1959) (fright
caused by truck crashing into house was compensable injury); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d
16, 20-22, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251-53, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998-1000 (1958) (cancerphobia consti-
tutes compensable injury in medical malpractice action); Savard v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 126
Vt. 405, 410, 234 A.2d 656, 660 (1967) (despite absence of physical injury, plaintiff may
recover for fright caused when truck crashed into house); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 436A comment c (1965) (lengthy mental disturbance may be deemed illness despite
its mental character).
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tinction between physical harm and psychic harm.4 In this sense,
"physical" would be a general term referring to harms to the "self'
and would include both bodily and mental injuries. This construc-
tion accords with the idea that body and mind are inextricably
connected and no injury to one can occur without some impact on
the other. Under this broad interpretation, no psychic injury would
escape protection solely because no objective physical symptoms
had occurred, and the expansive policies underlying strict products
liability would be best served.
The courts in several recent negligence cases extending full
protection to psychic equilibrium have held, as an alternative to
the physical harm requirement, that the psychic harm must be
"serious.' 1 45 Like the physical harm requirement, the seriousness
requirement limits liability by focusing on the nature and degree of
the injury rather than on the relationship between the conduct and
the injury.
The "seriousness" requirement is more difficult to apply than
the physical manifestation requirement. In the latter, the determi-
nation can be made purely as a matter of fact based on whether
there were physical manifestations. The former, however, requires
an evaluative judgment based on the plaintiff's testimony and ex-
pert medical evidence. Thus, the determination of whether the
judge or the jury decides the "seriousness" issue may affect its
practicality as a liability limiter. The seriousness standard is not so
complex, abstract, or open-ended that the jury would have diffi-
culty understanding what they are being asked to decide. In fact, it
would be an unusual case in which there were no objectively iden-
tifiable indications of seriousness even if there were no physical
symptoms. Thus, juries given adequate information are capable of
reaching a sensible conclusion on the seriousness issue. Further-
more, negligence cases provide guidance on the types of harm that
are sufficiently serious. In Paugh v. Hanks,4 the court found that
emotional distress must be both "severe and debilitating," and
that such emotional distress would include "traumatically induced
'44 See Seely v. White Motors Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 18, 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,
23 (1965).
"' See Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970); Paugh v.
Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 79, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1983); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 167-68,
404 A.2d 672, 683 (1979).
148 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983).
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neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia.1 41 The court in
Bass v. Nooney Co.148 held that the harm must be "medically
diagnosable and must be of sufficient severity so as to be medically
significant.' 49 Thus, the "seriousness" test is not so difficult as to
make its application impractical.
This leaves the question of whether the seriousness require-
ment is a standard that adequately considers the various interests
and policies involved. From the plaintiff's point of view, the seri-
ousness requirement is more equitable than the physical manifes-
tation requirement. In one sense, the seriousness requirement is
arbitrary because no similar requirement exists in cases involving
physical injury. If both bodily integrity and psychic equilibrium
are legally protected interests, it seems inconsistent to require seri-
ous harm in cases of injury to one and not the other. However,
though both are entitled to legal protection, the nature of the in-
terests is not the same. Things psychic are still more mysterious
and less comprehensible than things physical, and only recently
scientists have begun to delve into the depths of the psyche. The
injuries that it can sustain and the ramifications of such injuries
are not as widely known or understood as are bodily injuries. Proof
of seriousness may help allay any remaining fears that such inju-
ries are trivial or likely to be feigned.
Additionally, it is obvious that a certain amount of emotional
upset is part and parcel of existing in a crowded and often uncon-
genial world. 150 There is a need to learn how to cope with the mi-
nor ruffling of the emotional feathers that afflicts everyone from
time to time. The maxim de minimus non curat lex applies to
psychic harm as well as to other kinds of harm. Thus, from the
plaintiff's standpoint, the seriousness requirement seems to be a
reasonable compromise position between the need to compensate
genuine injury and the need to toughen the hide against "the slings
and arrows of outrageous fortune. ' '151
The defendant's primary interest in psychic harm cases is the
need to have some effective way of avoiding endless liability. The
seriousness requirement, though perhaps not adequate in itself, is
147 Id. at 79, 451 N.E.2d at 765.
148 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
149 Id. at 772-73.
150 RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965); Magruder, supra note 43,
at 1035.
151 HAMLET, Act I1, Scene i, line 58.
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a sensible approach to identifying the type of harm for which the
defendant will be responsible. Although probably not as effective
at eliminating classes of defendants as a "foreseeability" or "physi-
cal symptom" requirement, the seriousness standard will help to
prevent the filing of trivial suits. Even if the "seriousness" require-
ment does not specifically identify the extent of liability, as be-
tween a plaintiff who has suffered serious harm and a defendant
who has supplied a defective product, it does not seem unjust to
require the defendant to compensate the injured party. Although
the defendant might not be able to identify those who may poten-
tially recover, liability will not be limitless because only those with
serious psychic harm will succeed.
An additional consideration is the impact that the seriousness
requirement will have on the court system. Although perhaps not
the primary concern, the potential for a multitude of trivial and
possibly fraudulent claims is still a matter for concern. If serious-
ness is a question of law for the judge, its effect will be to cut down
the number of psychic harm cases that are fully litigated. Even if
seriousness is regarded as a jury question, it is likely that only
those injured parties convinced that they can actually prove seri-
ous psychic harm will seek legal vindication of their claims. Thus,
the number of psychic harm cases should not prove overly burden-
some for the legal system.
Another limiting device used in several cases involving the
negligent infliction of psychic harm that could be used in a strict
products liability context, is the requirement that "a reasonable
man, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately
with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the
case."1 52 This objective element requires a determination of
whether the circumstances that caused the psychic harm would
have caused such harm in one with a "normal" psyche.
The question of whether the normal person would be able to
cope will be for the jury to decide.' In determining the effective-
ness of this approach, the question arises whether the introduction
152 Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 173, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (1970); see Paugh v.
Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 79, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1983); see also Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146,
168, 404 A.2d 672, 683 (1979) (unreasonable to impose liability for mental distress exper-
ienced by timid, sensitive members of community).
"' Paugh v. Hanks, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 80, 451 N.E. 2d 759, 767 (1983); see also W.
PROSSER & W. KEEroN, supra note 8, § 37, at 235 (juries determine factual issues in negli-
gence actions).
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of this objective element would so complicate the case that the jury
would not understand what it was being asked to decide. Because
the ability to cope varies considerably from person to person, the
"normal ability to cope" standard could be a difficult concept to
pin down. Juries, however, are regularly asked to make determina-
tions based on what "the reasonable man" would have done. The
"normal ability to cope" standard is different only in that it asks
what the reasonable man would have suffered. Jurors should be
able to draw on their own experiences to determine whether the
reasonable person, normally constituted, would have suffered seri-
ous harm in the same or similar circumstances.
The "normal ability to cope" standard obviously excludes
those with a subnormal ability to deal with circumstances that
might produce a psychic disturbance. In light of the oft-stated tort
aphorism "you take the plaintiff as you find him,"'" the question
arises whether there is any justifiable reason for protecting the egg
shell skull, but not the egg shell psyche. 5" If no such reason exists,
this standard may have to be characterized as arbitrary, rather
than principled. Again, the resolution of this issue depends on
whether the policy furthered by application of the "normal ability
to cope" standard is outweighed by competing and inconsistent
policies. The innocent, injured plaintiff has an interest in being
compensated, regardless of whether he happens to be unusually
vulnerable to psychic stimuli. On the other hand, it has already
been noted that there is a societal benefit to be derived from en-
couraging people to deal with a certain amount of emotional un-
pleasantness. The defendant's interest in being free from intermi-
nable liability may tip the balance in favor of imposing this
5 See, e.g., Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669, 679. In Dulieu, a pregnant
woman who was frightened by the defendant's negligent driving of a horse van gave birth
prematurely to a mentally incompetent child. See id. at 670. The court drew a now-famous
analogy to a man with an "unusually thin skull" who suffers extraordinary injuries from the
negligence of another to illustrate that the defendant takes the plaintiff as he finds him. See
id. at 679; see also W. PROSSER, J. WADE, & V. SCHwARTz, TORTS: CASES AND MATERLAL 304
n.2 (7th ed. 1982) (courts "are agreed" that defendants are liable when unforeseeable conse-
quences result to plaintiff from defendants' acts).
15 A related problem arises if the circumstances created would cause serious psychic
harm in the person with a normal ability to cope, but the plaintiff, because of an idiosyn-
cracy or pre-existing condition, suffers more damage than would a normal person. In such a
case, the defendant should pay the entire damage. Any other position would produce a dam-
age rule that would be virtually unworkable, since the jury would then have to calculate how
much damage a normal person would have suffered. If this approach were taken, the "nor-
mal ability to cope" standard would be impractical.
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objective criterion. This is particularly true in strict products lia-
bility cases involving psychic harm, since the only other liability-
limiter may be a broad interpretation of the scope of the risk. If a
"normal ability to cope" requirement is imposed, the number of
psychic harm recoveries will be significantly reduced. In fact, such
a standard would probably limit liability in much the same manner
that foreseeability would. Without a foreseeability-type limitation
included in the broad scope of the risk approach, the television
viewer who claims psychic harm from seeing a stranger injured
may be able to recover. The imposition of a "normal ability to
cope" test will eliminate this class of plaintiffs. Jurors applying
their own experiences are unlikely to find that the normal person
could not cope with this kind of stress. Under this approach, al-
though there will be a few idiosyncratic plaintiffs, or plaintiffs with
pre-existing mental conditions who will suffer uncompensable inju-
ries, on balance, the "normal ability to cope" approach seems rea-
sonable. Furthermore, this approach would probably not have a
material impact on the judicial system. Although the requirement
would likely reduce the number of suits filed, the standard does
nothing to cut litigation off at an early point, because the question
of whether the plaintiff possesses a "normal ability to cope" would
be a question of fact for the jury rather than a question of law for
the judge.
An alternative to the seriousness and "normal ability to cope"
standards that would considerably simplify the determination of
liability for psychic harm would be a rule that would limit damages
to the plaintiff's actual economic loss.1"6 If ease of application is a
positive factor in determining the extent of liability, restricting
damages in this way has a distinct advantage over the other meth-
ods. Once injury and cause-in-fact are established, the only re-
maining qjuestion is what out-of-pocket losses the plaintiff has suf-
fered as a result of psychic harm. Under this approach, medical
expenses, lost wages, and future earning capacity would all be com-
pensable items of damage, while grief, fear, and similar emotional
injuries would not.
15. See Miller, supra note 5, at 38-43. Miller has proposed eliminating recovery for
purely emotional pain and suffering, while allowing recovery only for economic losses, such
as medical expenses. See id. The policy considerations advanced by Miller, while not em-
braced per se by the courts, are reflected by analogy in some decisions. See, e.g., Pinnick v.
Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 5-8, 271 N.E.2d 592, 597-98 (1971) (court upheld statute eliminating
recovery for pain and suffering for certain claimants of "no fault" insurance).
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This proposal is consistent with an economic approach to
strict products liability that is concerned with risk allocation and
the cost of accidents. Although it is likely that only serious psychic
harm would result in actual economic outlay, seriousness would
not be a consideration. In addition, the question of whether a per-
son with a normal ability to cope would have suffered the harm
would be irrelevant. Because idiosyncratic plaintiffs would be per-
mitted to recover, the size of the protected class might increase,
but the amounts of individual recoveries would be reduced. Thus,
although the extent of the defendant's liability would actually
broaden, plaintiffs might argue that this approach would affect
them negatively. In fact, certain grounds for recovery generally as-
sociated with psychic harm, such as grief, humiliation, anger, and
fear, would not be recoverable. This approach, however, would
guarantee that no plaintiff who suffers an economic loss would go
without recovery and would ensure that the scope of liability
would be determinable.
It is not altogether clear what impact limiting damages to eco-
nomic loss would have on the efficient administration of justice,
but it is arguable that it would encourage pretrial resolution of
cases. If the defendant admits that the product is defective, and
caused the injury, all that remains is to establish the amount of the
plaintiff's actual loss. Although this is a radical approach unlikely
to dchieve wide acceptance, it may be the best way to accommo-
date the various competing interests in strict products liability
cases. It would allow for a risk analysis approach without opening
the doors to indeterminable liability. If used in all strict products
liability cases, this proposal could provide a workable solution for
the current crisis in strict products liability law.
An examination of liability limiters in strict products liability
psychic harm cases would not be complete without a discussion of
the user-bystander distinction recently applied by a few courts.157
Although'the origin of this method for limiting liability is not alto-
157 See, e.g., Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co., 572 F. Supp. 1201, 1202-03 (D.S.D. 1983) (dic-
tum) (bystander cases "typically void of any product liability implications"); Barr v.
Rivinius Inc., 58 I. App. 3d 121, 126, 373 N.E.2d 1063, 1066-67 (1978) (bystander injured
by road construction machine cannot prevail inasmuch as his injury was not reasonably
foreseeable by manufacturer); Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 809, 418 N.E.2d 386,
386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871, 871 (1980) (mem.) (mother alleging emotional distress for child's
birth defects not entitled to recover). The confusion in this area of the law is fueled largely
by the failure of the Restatement to express an opinion on the matter. See RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A comment o (1965).
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gether clear, it appears to be unique to the products liability set-
ting. Under this approach, a person who is using a defective prod-
uct at the time it causes injury to a third person may recover for
psychic harm, but a bystander who merely observes an incident in
which a defective product causes injury may not.158 Advocates of
this test apparently consider the guilt associated with being indi-
rectly responsible for the injury a significant factor in assuming
that the plaintiff has actually suffered psychic harm.159 The test is
an easy one to apply. Generally, a cursory examination of the facts
will reveal whether the plaintiff was using the injury-producing
product. If the object of the practical liability limiters however, is
to achieve a rational means of accommodating both the need to
protect those who have suffered psychic harm and the need to de-
fine liability, the user-bystander distinction must be rejected. It
carries with it the potential for anomalous results, such as denying
recovery to a bystander-parent who is obviously likely to suffer
physical harm but granting recovery to a user-stranger who has no
personal relationship with the injured individual. Although a plain-
tiff's use of a product at the time an injury occurred may be a
relevant consideration in making a decision whether to impose lia-
bility under one of the other tests, the user-bystander distinction,
as a liability-limiting rule, is highly arbitrary.
3. Recommendation
Because strict products liability is concerned with the defen-
dant's creation of a risk that carries with it the potential for harm,
a theory of liability for psychic injury resulting from defective
products should be consistent with a broad risk analysis. There is
no doubt, however, that liability limited only by a determination of
whether the injury was within the scope of the risk created by the
defect in the product carries with it the possibility of attenuated
and indeterminable liability. To alleviate this problem, combining
18 Compare Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 18, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612, 613
(1977) (parent driving defective car could recover for physical injuries resulting from emo-
tional shock brought on by witnessing infliction of fatal injuries on daughter caused by de-
fect) with Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 101 Ill. App. 3d 439, 440, 442-43, 428 N.E.2d
596, 597, 599 (1981) (minor who witnessed brother suffer severe injuries caused by defective
escalator denied recovery for emotional distress under strict liability theory), af'd, 98 Ill. 2d
546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
'" See Joseph, supra note 11, at 2; Noel, Defective Products: Extension of Strict Lia-
bility to Bystanders, 38 TENN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1970); Note, supra note 11, at 301.
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the requirements that the harm actually be serious and that the
circumstances be such that the normally constituted person would
not be able to cope with them, is a reasonable compromise of the
various competing interests. It can be applied with relative ease to
a strict products liability case without muddying the doctrinal wa-
ters with extraneous negligence concepts such as foreseeability.
IV. RECOVERY FOR PSYCHIC HARM IN STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
A SURVEY OF CASES
The few courts that recently have faced the question of
whether damages for psychic harm should be recoverable in a strict
products liability context, with few exceptions, have shown the re-
luctance that has come to typify the attitude toward psychic harm.
In large part, the reasons for this resistance have tracked the rea-
sons for denial of recovery in earlier cases in which the theory of
the action was intentional tort or negligence. Some of the reason-
ing offered in the recent cases, however, suggests that there may be
something unique about strict products liability that compels an
approach different from that taken in a negligence case.
It has already been noted that psychic harm takes numerous
forms and that the circumstances giving rise to it are many and
varied. 160 Although this is no less true in situations involving defec-
tive products than in other areas, a few recurring patterns can be
identified. In the interest of clarity and to facilitate discussion, the
cases will be grouped according to the following recurring situa-
tions: cases in which the consumption of a contaminated food
product causes psychic harm, cases in which the fear of injury
through a sudden encounter with a defective product causes
psychic harm, cases in which a bystander's observation of another's
encounter with a defective product causes psychic harm, and cases
in which exposure to a carcinogenic substance causes psychic harm
(the "cancerphobia" cases). Similarity of factual situations in no
way ensures uniformity of results in strict products liability cases
claiming psychic harm. The response of a court depends in large
part upon how the jurisdiction approaches the various issues
presented in the case. For instance, does the jurisdiction require
impact? Has it extended liability for psychic harm to bystanders?
Does it require physical harm and, if so, how does it define it? Has
it extended strict products liability to bystanders? Once the inde-
160 See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
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pendent status of psychic harm as a legally protected interest is
firmly established and a satisfactory method for limiting liability is
accepted by the courts, much of the confusion and inconsistency
inherent in the case law will be avoided.
A. Contaminated Consumables
Early products liability cases that allowed recovery for psychic
harm usually involved psychological reactions to the discovery of
foreign objects or substances in food or drink. Perhaps the willing-
ness of courts to allow recovery in strict products liability in this
kind of case relates to the long history of recovery for psychic inju-
ries in contaminated food cases.18 1 For whatever reason, the con-
taminated food cases made an easy transition from negligence and
breach of warranty theories to strict products liability. As a broad
proposition, it is fair to state that psychic harm is a ground for
recovery under strict products liability if a consumable is contami-
nated by a foreign substance.16 2 For example, awards for psychic
harm have been based on strict products liability in cases in which
the plaintiff partially consumed a soft drink containing a decom-
posed mouse,18 3 a soft drink containing a "'grayish brown' and
'slimy looking' substance," 16 a soft drink containing metallic fil-
ings,18 5 a beer containing a mouse,86 and a can of soup containing
a cockroach.167
The courts have not expressed concern with the problem of
limiting liability in contaminated food cases, perhaps because there
are common characteristics that may act as liability limiters. In
each case, the plaintiffs have actually consumed a part of the bev-
erage and have subsequently manifested a cognizable physical re-
action to discovery of the unsavory substance. The physical mani-
"I' See R. DicKERSON, PRODUCTS LIABiLrrY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 236-37 (1951);
supra note 84.
1'2 See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. Beck, 176 Ind. 202, 204-05, 375 N.E.2d 640, 643 (1978) (hy-
podermic needle in steak); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 441-
42, 420 P.2d 855, 857 (1966) (decomposed mouse in bottled beverage).
63 Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski, 82 Nev. 439, 441, 420 P.2d 855, 857
(1966).
164 Stewart v. Barq's Beverages, Inc., 442 So. 2d 799, 799 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
65 Slonsky v. Phoenix Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 Ariz. App. 10, 11, 499 P.2d 741, 742
(1972).
16 Dirsa v. Martuscello, 76 App. Div. 2d 1020, 1021, 429 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (3d Dep't
1980) (mem.).
161 Obieli v. Campbell Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668, 668-69 (10th Cir. 1980).
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festations, however, have ranged from the relatively slight-6 to the
severe.169 As Professor Dickerson observed more than three de-
cades ago, "[w]henever the plaintiff's condition is directly related
to the discovery of the offending condition, it may be taken for
granted that psychological factors have played the preponderate
part." " Thus, psychic injury of at least one sort has long been
recognized in strict products liability.
B. Personal Encounter With Defective Product Causing Psychic
Harm
There are few reported cases in which a plaintiff has sued to
recover for psychic harm suffered as a result of a personal encoun-
ter with a defective product, and none in which psychic harm has
been the only injury claimed.' 7 ' As in other strict products liability
cases claiming psychic harm, the result depends on the approach of
the jurisdiction both toward the physical injury requirement in
strict products liability and toward recovery for psychic harm in
general.
188 See, e.g., Way v. Tampa Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288, 288 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972) (rat in bottle caused vomiting); Connell v. Norton Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 187
Kan. 393, 394, 357 P.2d 804, 806 (1960) (centipede in bottle resulted in nausea and vomit-
ing); Boyd v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 Tenn. 23, 25, 177 S.W. 80, 80 (1915) (cigar stub in
sealed bottle of soft drink caused nausea).
169 See, e.g., Obieli v. Campbell Soup Co., 623 F.2d 668, 669 (10th Cir. 1980) (stomach
disorder, venous thrombosis, pulmonary emboli, and esophageal hiatus hernia requiring hos-
pitalization); Slonsky v. Phoenix Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 18 Ariz. App. 10, 11, 499 P.2d 741,
742 (1972) (severe nausea); Stewart v. Barq's Beverages Inc., 442 So. 2d 799, 799 (La. Ct.
App. 1983) (nausea, diarrhea, and dizziness); Shoshone Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Dolinski,
82 Nev. 439, 446, 420 P.2d 855, 859 (1966) (vomiting and weight loss); Dirsa v. Martuscello,
76 App. Div. 2d 1020, 1021, 429 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (3d Dep't 1980) (mem.) (gastroenteritis,
intestinal distress of the pylorus, hyposthenia, dysnystaxis, painful swallowing, and phobia
of bottled liquids).
170 R. DIcKERSoN, supra note 161, at 238.
7 Awards for psychic harm have traditionally been low, and most attorneys discourage
clients from pursuing claims in which the amount of the award is unlikely to cover even the
cost of the litigation. Thus, the few cases in which courts have addressed the problem of a
plaintiff who has been psychically harmed through a direct confrontation with a defective
product have involved physical harm caused by psychic trauma or psychic harm accompany-
ing some other injury caused by the product. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Parker Feeders Inc., 547
F.2d 357, 366 (7th Cir. 1976) (recovery for psychic harm accompanied by physical injury to
leg).
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1. Psychic Harm Without Physical Injury
The Illinois Appellate Court in Rahn v. Gerdts,7 2 recently
held fast to that state's restrictive interpretation of the physical
harm requirement of section 402A. In Rahn, the plaintiff was
forced to leap from her burning motor home. Although she was not
injured, several weeks later she entered a hospital psychiatric ward
where she was treated for depression, anxiety, and nervousness.
The court followed an earlier Illinois bystander case which held
that damages caused by emotional distress, unaccompanied by
other physical injury, are not compensable in a strict liability ac-
tion.17 3 Because nervousness, depression, and anxiety frequently
have been recognized as sufficient to satisfy a "physical manifesta-
tion" requirement, 174 it may be inferred that in Illinois, "physical
harm" in strict products liability implies a physical injury caused
by some direct contact with the defective product. 7 5
The result in Rahn illustrates the difficulties engendered by a
restrictive interpretation of the "physical harm" limitation in sec-
tion 402A. The plaintiff in Rahn suffered psychic injury as a direct
result of a traumatic experience caused by a defective product. The
harm was so severe that she was hospitalized and needed psychiat-
ric care. Under any of the recognized or recommended methods for
defining liability, the plaintiff should recover. It is certainly "fore-
17. 119 IM. App. 3d 781, 455 N.E.2d 807 (1983).
-- Id. at 784-85, 455 N.E.2d at 809; see Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 38,
402 N.E.2d 194, 200 (1980). For a discussion of Woodill, see infra notes 228-232 and accom-
panying text.
'74 See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal. 3d 59, 76-77, 562 P.2d 1022, 1031, 137 Cal. Rptr.
863, 872 (1977); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 433, 426 P.2d 173, 178-79, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13, 18-19 (1967) (en banc); Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 234, 249
P.2d 843, 844 (1952).
'75 The Rahn court further concluded that Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 Ill. 2d
546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983), which broadened recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress to cover non-impact situations, did nothing to change the Illinois requirement of
direct contact because the focus in Rickey was on the nature of the defendant's conduct.
Rahn, 119 IM. App. 3d at 784-85, 455 N.E.2d at 809. The Court of Appeals in Rahn read the
Illinois Supreme Court opinion in Rickey to limit recovery to negligence cases, in which the
focus is on foreseeability. Id. Although the court noted that there might be some support for
the plaintiff's suggestion that the rationale for permitting recovery for mental distress in
negligence cases should be applicable to strict products liability, the court declined to ex-
tend it absent direction from the Illinois Supreme Court. Id. The language used by the court
on this point is not altogether clear, but the implication is that foreseeability might not be a
relevant factor in a strict products liability case. Even if this is a correct interpretation, it is
clear that the plaintiff claiming psychic harm without actual contact in Illinois should pur-
sue a negligence claim if one is available, because a strict products liability recovery un-
doubtedly will be denied.
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seeable" that the necessity of leaping from a flaming trailer will
cause severe fright that might necessitate future care. In the event
that foreseeability is rejected as a limiter in strict products liabil-
ity, it cannot be denied that the harm was "serious" or that a nor-
mally constituted person would react in such a manner, or at least
that the issue of harm should be decided by a jury. Further, under
an economic loss theory, it is clear that the plaintiff could establish
that she had incurred medical expenses and, very likely, that she
had either lost earnings or incurred expenditures for child care. To
deny recovery merely because the plaintiff did not establish ade-
quately "physical harm" flies in the face of any policy underlying
strict products liability.
In marked contrast to the narrow approach to "physical
harm" taken by the court in Rahn, is the broad reading given the
physical harm requirement of section 402A by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals in Walters v. Mintec International.7 6 The plain-
tiff in Walters claimed physical injury from psychic disturbance
after he narrowly escaped serious injury or death when a loading
crane designed by Mintec collapsed. In response to Mintec's claim
that injury resulting from psychic shock can never be physical
harm within the meaning of 402A, the court pointed to the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts definition of physical harm and to
section 436177 relating to physical harm resulting from emotional
distress. Noting the kinds of symptoms considered sufficient to
constitute physical harm in the commentary to 436A, it found the
evidence of plaintiff's headaches, weakness under stress, insomnia,
and nightmares sufficient to satisfy the physical harm require-
ment.17 8 It also made special mention of plaintiff's psychiatrist's
testimony that plaintiff suffered from post-traumatic stress syn-
drome, a mental illness. Because the court had before it a claim for
physical harm caused by psychic injury rather than a claim for
psychic harm alone, it is difficult to deduce whether a claim of the
mental illness alone would have satisfied the court. It is obvious,
however, that this court is open to the idea of allowing recovery for
psychic harm under a theory of strict products liability. In reach-
ing its conclusion that the defendant's defectively designed prod-
uct was the legal cause of the plaintiff's injury, the court specifi-
1.76 758 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1985).
177 Id. at 77-79.
178 Id. at 78-79.
1985]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
cally noted that the policy basis of strict products liability justified
imposition of liability in cases in which plaintiff's injury is a result
of psychic shock.
There is no apparent reason why the policy objectives of section
402A should apply with less force when the physical harm results
from emotional disturbance than when the harm results from
some sort of tortious impact.
Although it may be argued that liability should be more lim-
ited when it is imposed without regard to fault, there is little indi-
cation that such a concern would act as a limitation on the under-
lying policies of section 402A. The thrust of these policies is to
expand rather than restrict liability, by placing the burden of the
consequences of accidental injuries caused by products upon the
party who is best able to bear it.179
The court's decision to make the extent of liability commensurate
with the expansive policies underlying strict products liability is
consistent with a broad risk analysis approach to determining the
parameters of liability.
2. Psychic Harm Accompanying Physical Injury
A number of courts have made awards for psychic harm in ad-
dition to damages for physical injuries. Although it is not always
clear which amount is attributable to the psychic harm and which
amount to the physical injury,18° in one recent case, the major part
of the award was for the psychic harm. In Thomasson v. A.K. Dur-
nin Chrysler-Plymouth,""" the plaintiff was injured in an accident
involving a defective automobile. She sustained some physical in-
jury, but the bulk of her award was for the psychic harm she
claimed as a result of the accident.18 2 The case is particularly inter-
179 Id. at 79.
189 See, e.g., DeSantis v. Parker Feeders Inc., 547 F.2d 357, 366 (7th Cir. 1976). In De-
Santis, the 12-year-old plaintiff was injured by a defective auger on a cattle feeder. Id. at
360. His injuries required the amputation of his left leg and two toes on his right foot. Id. A
psychiatrist testified at trial that the plaintiff suffered a "posttraumatic personality disor-
der" that made it likely that he would suffer emotional difficulties in the future. Id. at 365.
Although the $840,000 in damages was not broken down into physical and psychic compo-
nents, the fact that the trial court allowed, and the court of appeals approved, the psychiat-
ric testimony indicates that psychological damage is cognizable in a federal strict products
liability case, at least when there is some physical injury.
181 399 So. 2d 1205 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
181 See id. at 1209-10. The plaintiff in Thomasson was awarded $2,000 for physical inju-
ries and $17,500 for mental suffering. Id.
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esting because the plaintiff had suffered psychological disorders
before the accident. Although the court, on appeal, recognized that
the automobile "was carrying a very mentally fragile passenger
when the accident occurred,' 18 3 and acknowledged that her psychic
harm was unreasonable, it awarded her a sum for her mental dis-
tress almost nine times greater than the award for her physical in-
jury. Thomasson is an excellent example of the difficulties caused
by the eggshell psyche. The trial court recognized that the plaintiff
had a pre-existing psychic disorder and considered the triggering
of it compensable. If a defect in a product merely triggers a pre-
existing condition, however, it is questionable whether the defect
was a substantial factor in causing the harm. This area of uncer-
tainty, coupled with the subjective character of the injury and con-
sequent problems of proof, militates in favor of imposing an objec-
tive standard in judging psychic harm. If the trial court in
Thomasson had questioned whether the circumstances would have
resulted in serious psychic harm in a normally constituted person,
the response would have been negative. Although the imposition of
an objective standard in an eggshell psyche case may result in a
few legitimately injured plaintiffs going uncompensated, the defen-
dant's interest in having some limitations and certainty as to the
extent of his liability may tip the scale against the imposition of
liability.
C. Bystander Cases
The bystander who suffers psychic harm from witnessing an-
other's injury caused by a defective product has the most obstacles
to overcome in strict products liability. To recover under such cir-
cumstances, a number of prerequisites must be met. Probably no
state court would entertain such a suit absent adoption by the ju-
risdiction of:
(1) some form of strict products liability;
(2) a recognition that bystanders injured by defective products
may recover;
(3) an acceptance of a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress;
(4) an extension of that doctrine to allow recovery for emotional
distress to bystanders witnessing injuries to third parties; and
(5) a broad interpretation of the physical harm requirement of
183 Id. at 1209.
1985]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
section 402A.
Even if all these prerequisites can be satisfied, recovery is by no
means assured. Because the results in these cases depend, to a
large degree, on the state of the law in the place where the case
was decided, the bystander cases will be discussed according to
jurisdiction.
1. California
Appropriately, California, which was the first jurisdiction to
adopt strict liability in tort for injuries caused by defective prod-
ucts,"" and to extend recovery for emotional distress to a by-
stander who was not in the zone of danger,'85 was one of the first
to extend recovery under strict products liability to bystanders in-
jured by defective products, 8 ' and was the first jurisdiction to con-
sider whether a bystander suffering psychic harm caused by wit-
nessing an injury to a third party may recover under a strict
products liability theory.18 7 Three different divisions of the Califor-
nia Court of Appeal have considered this question with inconsis-
tent results.
In Park v. Standard Chemical Way Co., 88 the plaintiff sued
in strict products liability for the psychic harm that she suffered as
a result of finding her husband several hours after he had been
injured by an exploding drain cleaner. The husband sued for his
physical injuries and the wife for psychic harm and consequent
physical injuries. The court recognized the husband's action for his
injuries based on a theory of strict liability, 89 but summarily re-
jected the wife's claim, also based on strict liability, stating "that
Dillon v. Legg which allowed recovery for emotional distress to a
bystander not in the zone of danger did not apply because nothing
in the complaint suggested any negligence on the part of the defen-
'1 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62-63, 377 P.2d 897, 900-01, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 700-01 (1962).
"I' See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 732-33, 441 P.2d 912, 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75
(1968).
's See Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 652, 657 (1969).
187 See Park v. Standard Chem. Way Co., 60 Cal. App. 3d 47, 50, 131 Cal. Rptr. 338,
339 (1976).
188 60 Cal. App. 3d 47, 131 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976).
188 Id. at 50, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
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dant."190 The clear implication of the court's refusal to entertain
the wife's cause of action absent a showing of negligence is that the
Dillon doctrine is unavailable when the underlying theory is strict
products liability or warranty. Unfortunately, the court gave no
justification or explanation for its conclusion. The Park court
could have avoided its overbroad conclusion that Dillon does not
apply in strict liability19 and still have found that, under the facts
of the case, Dillon did not apply because two of the three Dillon
foreseeability factors were not satisfied. 92 In this way the court
could have avoided the question of whether the extension of Dillon
to strict products liability is appropriate, by noting that Mrs. Park
was not the type of bystander contemplated by Dillon.193
In Shepard v. Superior Court,9 the Court of Appeal for the
First District of California took the opposite view from that es-
poused in Park. The facts in Shepard provided a much better ve-
hicle for the consideration of the extension of Dillon to strict prod-
ucts liability because all the Dillon requirements were met. In
Shepard, the family of a child killed in a traffic accident brought a
strict products liability action against the manufacturer of the car
to recover for physical injuries resulting from emotional shock suf-
fered after witnessing the injuries inflicted on the decedent.195
Ford, the defendant, argued that Dillon would apply only
under a theory of negligence. The California Court of Appeal dis-
agreed and extended Dillon to strict products liability, 96 appar-
ently because the majority saw no distinction between a cause of
action based on negligence and a cause of action based on strict
products liability. The court stated that "[tio permit recovery
against the negligent driver and exempt the manufacturer respon-
sible for the defective condition contributing to the injuries would
defy common sense and be inconsistent with the realities of mod-
ern society. ' 19 7 The court further noted that any danger the manu-
190 See id.
191 See id.
'92 See id. Mrs. Park was not near the scene of the accident and had no sensory obser-
vation of it. Id.; see Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
193 See Dillon, 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. After Ochoa v.
Superior Ct., 39 Cal. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1985), it is possible that not
having sensorily experienced the accident would not have been fatal to Mrs. Park's claim.
194 76 Cal. App. 3d 16, 142 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1977).
195 Id. at 19, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 613-14.
199 Id. at 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
197 Id. at 21, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
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facturer might suffer on account of a potential for unlimited liabil-
ity could be controlled by the imposition of the Dillon
restrictions. 198 Thus, if the Dillon foreseeability requirements are
satisfied, the plaintiff states a cause of action for recovery of dam-
ages for emotional distress under strict liability, as well as under
negligence. In support of its focus on foreseeability as the operative
factor, the majority noted that the extension of strict products lia-
bility to redress injuries to bystanders is based on the idea that
injury to bystanders is "a perfectly foreseeable risk of the maker's
enterprise," 99 and stated that "[u]nder the theory of strict liabil-
ity, as in negligence, the injury and harm must be 'reasonably fore-
seeable.' "200 Whether the concept of foreseeability has any legiti-
mate role to play in strict products liability has been already
discussed.20 1 Although the result reached by the majority may be
appropriate, the depth of its analysis of the problems involved
leaves something to be desired.202
The most recent California case to address the issue of recov-
ery for psychic harm in a strict products liability context is Kately
v. Wilkinson. °3 In Kately, the plaintiff, owner of a speed boat,
struck and killed a water skier because a defect in the boat caused
the steering mechanism to malfunction.0 4 The plaintiff and her
daughter, who were in the boat at the time of the accident, claimed
damages for psychic harm against the manufacturer based on both
strict products liability and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
190 See id.
Id. at 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615 (quoting Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal.
2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 89, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 657 (1969)).
200 Shepard, 76 Cal. App. 3d at 20, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 615 (citing Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 437 (1972)).
20" See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
202 Unlike the majority in Shepard, the dissent gave careful consideration to important
issues raised by the application of Dillon to cases based on strict liability. Among these
issues are the difficulty of proving emotional injury, see 76 Cal. App. 3d at 25, 142 Cal. Rptr.
at 617-18 (Kane, J., dissenting), the culpability of the defendant, see id. at 25-26, 142 Cal.
Rptr. at 618 (Kane, J., dissenting), and socioeconomic considerations such as enterprise lia-
bility, see id. at 26-28, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 619-20 (Kane, J., dissenting).
20 148 Cal. App. 3d 576, 195 Cal. Rptr 902 (1983).
2 4 Id. at 580-81, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04. As the decedent, a family friend, was being
towed as a skier, the steering column on the boat locked, causing the boat to circle and
strike her. Id. The decedent was pulled from the water, and since the boat was inoperable,
the plaintiffs, who were mother and daughter, "were compelled to sit with the decedent in
her badly mutilated condition." Id. at 580, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 904. As a result of this, the
plaintiffs experienced great physical and mental suffering, as well as emotional problems. Id.
at 581, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
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tress.2 05 Because the Kately court was unable to "conceive of any
reasonable basis for applying a different rule in a cause of action
for negligence than that applied in causes of action for products
liability and breach of ...warranty, '20 6 it concluded that the
plaintiffs need not establish physical harm.207
The most intriguing aspect of this case is the court's discus-
sion of whether the appellant should be treated as a bystander, or
as a user of the product.208 The court concluded that the Dillon
foreseeability factors should not restrict the plaintiff's recovery,
because her injuries were a direct result of the defendant's tortious
conduct.20 9 The court applied the Molien foreseeability approach
and found that the defendants should reasonably have foreseen
that the plaintiff, as purchaser and operator of a defective boat,
would suffer emotional distress if the boat malfunctioned and
killed someone.210 This kind of distress is foreseeable even if no
familial relationship exists between the user and the victim. 211 Ap-
parently, the court concluded that the responsibility and guilt that
a person would naturally feel at being the agent, albeit the indirect
agent, of another's death, is sufficient to satisfy the foreseeability
requirement. It is foreseeable, of course, that the use of a defective
product that causes the death of another may produce psychic
harm in the user. It is equally foreseeable, however, that a by-
stander who sees a defective product kill a child she loved as a
daughter, as she stands by helplessly, will suffer psychic harm. The
situation in Kately highlights the difficulties in making a distinc-
tion between a user and a bystander, especially if the distinction is
based on one being a foreseeable victim and the other not. Without
the peculiarities of the California Harbors and Navigation Code,212
the plaintiff's daughter would not have recovered.2 1 3 It seems ab-
201 Id. at 579, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
206 Id. at 586, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 908.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 587-88, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 909. In the first part of its opinion, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth District of California addressed the question of whether the plaintiffs
could recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 579, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
The court held that a close friendship was insufficient to satisfy the Dillon requirement that
the parties be closely related, and therefore, that the plaintiffs would not recover under such
a theory. Id.
101 Id. at 589, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
210 See id. at 587-88, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
211 See id. at 588, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
212 See CAL. HRaB. & NAV. CODE § 658(a) (Deering 1978).
212 The Harbors and Navigation Code prohibits water skiing unless there is an observer
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surd to make a distinction between the mother and the daughter in
this instance based on the supposition that the psychic harm to
the mother was more foreseeable simply because she was driving
the boat.
There is some suggestion that foreseeability is not the only
reason that the court allowed the user to recover while denying
recovery to the bystander. One point on which the court focused
that is arguably different from the foreseeability approach is that
the user of a product is a direct victim, while the bystander is
not.214 The difficulty with this approach is that in a case such as
this it is not altogether clear who the "direct" victims are. Argua-
bly, the only "direct" victim is the water skier. The damages suf-
fered by the plaintiff and her daughter were in one sense indirect,
in that they occurred not as a result of any physical effect that the
defective product had on them, but as a result of the effect the
product had on the skier. On the other hand, the psychic shock of
witnessing the mutilation and demise of another human being was
in every sense direct. If this analysis is used, it is difficult to under-
stand how the psychological impact of such a tragic event can be
regarded as direct with respect to the user, and only indirect with
respect to the bystander. Certainly, from the standpoint of causa-
tion, the effect is the same because the defect in the product
caused the daughter's injuries no less than it caused the mother's.
Although the fact that the plaintiff was using the product at the
time it malfunctioned is a relevant factor, it should not be the only
factor in determining who recovers and who does not in strict
products liability cases in which the plaintiff cannot satisfy the
Dillon requirements. The approach taken by the Kately court in
applying a user-bystander distinction appears to add another rigid
foreseeability requirement to cases sounding in strict products lia-
bility. A more flexible approach would be to regard the plaintiff's
"user" status as a consideration in deciding whether the product-
related incident was one that would cause serious psychic harm to
a person with a normal psyche.
in addition to the operator. See id. Therefore, as the one responsible for observing, the
daughter was a direct victim of the defective product, and not a bystander. See Kately, 148
Cal. App. 3d at 588-89, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 910.
2I Kately, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 588, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
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2. New York
Much has been made of the divergent views taken by the Cali-
fornia and New York courts on the issue of bystander recovery for
emotional distress. 15 Even though New York was a front runner in
protecting the interest in psychic equilibrium from negligent inju-
ries, 216 the New York Court of Appeals in Tobin v. Grossman217
held that a bystander may not recover for psychic harm caused by
witnessing an accident that causes severe physical injury to a third
person.218 In spite of its recognition of the importance of the inter-
est in psychic equilibrium, the Tobin court found that the diffi-
culty of limiting liability in bystander situations was too great.219
In Vaccaro v. Squibb,220 the only New York case to consider
recovery for psychic harm based on strict products liability, the
plaintiffs were parents of a child born with severe birth defects al-
legedly caused by an anti-miscarriage drug administered to the
mother during her pregnancy. The Appellate Division, though
holding that Tobin precluded the father from recovering because
he had not ingested the drug, held that the mother stated a cause
of action because a duty was owed directly to her as a user of the
product.221 In other words, the court made a distinction between
the mother as a user of the drug and the father as a bystander.
Because bystanders may not recover for psychic harm in New
York, the father was denied relief.
The Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the wife's cause of
action.222 Because it was a memorandum opinion there is no analy-
115 See, e.g., Simons, supra note 15, at 1-2; Note, The Negligent Infliction of Mental
Distress: The Scope of Duty and Foreseeability of Injury, 57 N.DL. REV. 577, 577-78, 586
(1981).
216 See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 109, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896). The
Mitchell court held that there could be recovery for the physical consequences of mental
suffering if there was some impact. Id. at 110, 45 N.E. at 355. The impact requirement was
relaxed in Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E. 431 (1931), where the court affirmed
a lower court's refusal to charge the jury that impact harm was required for damages for
fright or shock. Id. at 239, 177 N.E. at 435. The court stated that "[m]ental suffering or
disturbance, even without consequences of physical injury, may in fact constitute actual
damage." Id. at 235, 177 N.E. at 432.
217 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
218 See id. at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
219 See id. at 616-18, 249 N.E.2d at 423-24, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559-61.
210 71 App. Div. 2d 270, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1st Dep't 1979), rev'd, 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418
N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
221 See id. at 277-78, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 683-84.
222 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1980).
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sis by the majority. The only indication of the court's reasoning is
in the dissent, which stated that the case was dismissed because
the majority had overlooked the fact that the mother was a con-
sumer of the drug, and, instead, focused on her as a bystander suf-
fering through concern for her deformed child."' 3 Because the Vac-
caro court did not consider the strict liability aspects of the case, it
is difficult to conclude what inferences may be drawn from the de-
cision.2s* Although nothing in the opinion precludes recovery when
223 See id. at 812, 418 N.E.2d at 387, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 872 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
114 Courts in three other jurisdictions have considered psychic harm in the context of
strict products liability. None of these courts addressed the questions raised by extending
recovery in a strict liability case. In General Motors v. Grizzle, 642 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1982), a Texas court affirmed a $40,000 award for psychic harm to a mother who came
upon an accident involving her daughter moments after it occurred. Id. at 844. The court
found the defendants strictly liable for injuries resulting from a design defect in a pickup
truck. Id. at 842-43. The majority focused on the question of whether a parent who did not
sensorily experience the accident that harmed a child could recover for psychic harm. The
court found it foreseeable that observation of the consequences of the accident moments
after it occurred could cause psychic harm. Id. at 844. The court made no comment on the
fact that the theory of the case was strict liability and that the psychic harm cases relied on
were grounded in negligence.
In a rather backhanded manner, the Supreme Court of Nevada approved an award for
psychic harm based on strict products liability. In Jacobson v. Manfredi, 679 P.2d 251 (Nev.
1984), a small child seriously injured his intestinal tract when he drank liquid solder. Id. at
252. In discussing the jury's award of damages for psychic harm to the mother, and its
failure to award damages to the father, the court noted that the jury could have found that
the father had misused the product. Id. at 257. The court noted that since the mother "was
not using the product and did not leave it within [the child's] reach, the jury again consist-
ently could have found she was entitled to recover on a strict products liability theory." Id.
Although this statement was dictum, it is an indication that the Nevada court is willing to
protect the interest in psychic equilibrium in strict products liability actions.
An unusual case decided by the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
Mississippi was Lovelace v. Astra Trading Corp., 439 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Miss. 1977), in
which the plaintiff claimed damages based on negligence and strict products liability when
an allegedly defective hair dryer caused a fire which severely damaged his house. Id. at 755.
Although the plaintiff was not present when the fire first started, he returned home to see
his house burning. Id. Eighteen days later, he was diagnosed as having high blood pressure,
which led to bypass surgery, and ultimately permanent disability. Id. The plaintiff alleged
that his condition was caused by the fire. The defendant moved for partial summary judg-
ment, claiming that Mississippi did not extend recovery under strict products liability to
bystanders, and sought a declaration that recovery, if any, be limited to property damage.
Id. at 755-56. The court denied the motion, holding that Mississippi would recognize by-
stander recovery in strict products liability, and that the plaintiff could recover for his per-
sonal injuries if he could establish that the fire caused the injury. Id. at 760-61. In reaching
its conclusion that summary judgment was inappropriate, the court noted that section 402A
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs allows for recovery for personal injuries arising
from the use of a defective product, and that the foreseeability of injury, which it found to
be at the heart of a strict liability case, is a question for the trier of fact. Id. at 761. Obvi-
ously, the plaintiff's injuries were caused not by any personal contact with the defective
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the theory of the action is strict products liability, the resistance to
bystander recovery may prevent most psychic harm victims from
recovering.225 The conclusion reached by the majority of the Court
of Appeals casts doubt on whether "user" status is an important
consideration.
3. Illinois
The Illinois courts also have considered the question of
whether bystander recovery for psychic harm is available in a strict
products liability case. Unlike the emotional distress plaintiff in
California, the plaintiff in Illinois has had a significantly more dif-
ficult task. Although Illinois has adopted section 402A and has ex-
tended it to bystanders,226 the rights of the plaintiff seeking recov-
ery for emotional distress have been uncertain.227
The issue was first addressed by an Illinois court in Woodill v.
Parke Davis & Co. 228 In Woodill, psychic harm was claimed by the
mother of a child born with brain damage, allegedly caused by the
administration of pitocin, a drug used to induce labor.229 In dic-
tum, the minois Court of Appeals rejected out of hand any sugges-
tion that recovery for emotional distress should be allowed under
strict products liability, claiming that section 402A of the Restate-
ment "expressly limits recovery to physical harm.'"230 On appeal,
product, but rather, by the psychic shock that occurred when he saw the damage to his
home. Rather than addressing the question of whether Mississippi recognized recovery for
physical manifestations of psychic trauma in strict products liability, the court simply as-
sumed that such a circumstance presented a question of fact for the jury.
225 A recent New York products liability decision based on a negligence theory indicates
that even if the plaintiff can successfully cast himself as a user rather than as a bystander,
the road to recovery is by no means clear. In Kennedy v. McKesson, 58 N.Y.2d 500, 448
N.E.2d 1332, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1983), the plaintiff, a dentist, alleged that a faulty anes-
thetic machine caused the death of his patient. Id. at 502-03, 448 N.E.2d at 1333, 462
N.Y.S.2d at 421-22. The court stated that "there is no duty to protect from emotional injury
a bystander to whom there is otherwise owed no duty, and, even as to a participant to whom
a duty is owed, such injury is compensable only when a direct, rather than a consequential,
result of the breach." Id. at 506, 448 N.E.2d at 1335, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 424. Because the direct
result of the breach was the death of the patient, Kennedy's psychic harm was merely con-
sequential. See id. at 506-07, 448 N.E.2d at 1335-36, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 424-25.
226 See, e.g., Palmer v. Aico Distrib. Corp., 82 Ill. 2d 211, 216, 412 N.E.2d 959, 965
(1980).
227 See Rickey v. Chicago Transit Auth., 98 IMI. 2d 546, 555, 457 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1983). The
Illinois Supreme Court only recently rejected the impact requirement in favor of a "zone-of-
physical danger" approach. Id.
228 58 111. App. 3d 349, 374 N.E.2d 683 (1978), aff'd, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980).
229 Id. at 350, 374 N.E.2d at 684-85.
220 Id. at 355, 374 N.E.2d at 687-88; see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A
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the Illinois Supreme Court referred to the lower court's dictum as
"an alternative ground for holding that count II failed to state a
cause of action,"' 231 and adopted the decision of the court of ap-
peals on that point.232
In Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority,233 the Illinois Court
of Appeals again considered whether recovery for emotional dis-
tress is available under a strict products liability theory. In Rickey,
the plaintiff's brother suffocated when his scarf became entangled
in an escalator mechanism.3 4 The plaintiff, who witnessed this
event, experienced severe emotional, and behavioral disturbances.
He was unable to conduct normal activities at home and at school,
and required continuing psychiatric care. Citing Woodill for the
proposition that Illinois does not recognize a cause of action for
mental and emotional distress under a strict products liability the-
ory, the court summarily rejected the plaintiff's strict liability
claim noting that the plaintiff had cited no authority in support of
such a theory.23 3
Unless Illinois courts reconsider this restrictive approach to
the physical harm requirement in strict products liability, plain-
tiffs seeking recovery for psychic harm will continue to fail. It is
difficult to imagine a more deserving victim than the plaintiff in
Rickey, whose life was shattered by his observation of his brother's
accidental death. His psychic injuries were serious, easily verifia-
ble, and certainly understandable under the circumstances. To
deny him recovery, regardless of which legal theory is used, high-
lights the absurdity of denying the interest in psychic equilibrium
full protection.
4. Iowa
The Supreme Court of Iowa is the only state court of last re-
sort to have recognized bystander recovery of damages for psychic
harm based on a strict products liability theory. The decision in
Walker v. Clark Equipment Co.236 came hard on the heels of Barn-
hill v. Davis, in which the same court had extended recovery for
(1965).
2 79 Ill. 2d 26, 38, 402 N.E.2d 194, 200 (1980).
232 Id.
233 101 IlI. App. 3d 439, 428 N.E.2d 596 (1981), afl'd, 98 Ill. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 1 (1983).
234 Id. at 440, 428 N.E.2d at 597.
235 Id. at 442-43, 428 N.E.2d at 599.
230 320 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa Ct. App. 1982).
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negligent infliction of emotional distress to bystanders. 37
The court in Walker, recognizing that the stage was set in
Iowa for extending the Barnhill doctrine, held that bystanders
may recover damages for psychic harm under a strict products lia-
bility theory.2 8 Unfortunately, instead of engaging in any reasoned
analysis or explanation of why a doctrine rooted firmly in negli-
gence should be transplanted to strict products liability, the court
adopted a "why not" approach.239 Although the court's holding is
laudable in its recognition that the interest in freedom from
psychic harm should be granted full protection, the lack of analysis
is disconcerting. Apparently the Walker court proceeded on the as-
sumption that, because the facts of the case are the same and the
damages suffered are the same, the approach to the case should be
the same regardless of the legal theory asserted.240 There are, how-
ever, differences between negligence and strict products liability
that should not be ignored. Unless courts specifically address those
differences and present supportable methods for protecting the in-
terest in psychic equilibrium under both theories, the confusion
surrounding the area will never abate and courts leery of the inter-
est in psychic equilibrium will continue to resist affording it full
protection.
5. South Dakota
In Gnirk v. Ford Motor Co.,241 a recent federal case interpret-
ing South Dakota law, the plaintiff sued for psychic harm that she
suffered as a result of witnessing the death of her child.2 42 Al-
though South Dakota had previously refused to award damages to
bystander plaintiffs in both negligence and strict products liability
cases,243 the court in Gnirk neatly sidestepped this issue by charac-
237 300 N.W.2d 104, 105-06 (Iowa 1981).
231 See 320 N.W.2d at 563.
239 See id. The court initially supported its holding by citing prior Iowa cases that had
extended recovery under strict products liability to bystanders. Id. The court then noted
that once liablity is found, the recovery should be the same under theories of warranty,
strict liability, or negligence. Id.
240 See id.
241 572 F. Supp. 1201 (D.S.D. 1983).
242 See id. at 1201-02 & n.1. In Gnirk, the plaintiff had momentarily gotten out of her
car to open a fence, and left the car running. Id at 1202. The car shifted into reverse and
rolled into a lake, drowning the plaintiff's son. Id. As a result, the plaintiff alleged perma-
nent psychological injury, physical illness, insomnia, and depression. Id.
243 For a discussion of South Dakota products liability law, see generally Dugan, Re-
flections on South Dakota's Trifurcated Law of Products Liability, 28 S.D.L. REv. 259
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terizing the plaintiff as a "user," rather than a bystander, because
she had been driving the defective car shortly before it malfunc-
tioned and caused the death of her child.244 Apparently, the court
assumed that a cause of action for psychic harm exists under sec-
tion 402A as long as the plaintiff can make a sufficient showing of
resulting physical symptoms. Thus, it focused on the physical
harm question and concluded that the increased understanding of
the relationship between physical and psychic injury justified find-
ing that physical injury includes depression, weight gain, nervous-
ness, and nightmares.2 45 It found substantial support in case law
and in the Restatement for its conclusion that the plaintiff's inju-
ries were sufficient to satisfy the physical harm requirement.4 8
In Gnirk, the court's characterization of the plaintiff as a user
rather than a bystander made it possible for her to recover in a
jurisdiction that does not generally recognize either bystander re-
covery for psychic harm or bystander recovery in strict products
liability. Obviously, jurisdictions such as South Dakota need to ad-
dress these troubling dilemmas directly. An approach that would
take into account the seriousness of the harm and the reasonable-
ness of the plaintiff's reaction under the circumstances would allow
courts to avoid the machinations engaged in by the Gnirk court to
provide recovery to a genuinely injured plaintiff.
D. Cancerphobia
The recent upsurge in "cancerphobia 2 47 claims presents a
unique class of cases in which products liability and psychic injury
coincide. Many of the cases have proceeded in negligence rather
than strict liability,248 but the critical issues require attention in an
(1983).
244 See Gnirk, 572 F. Supp. at 1202-03.
245 See id. at 1204-05.
46 Id.; see Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291, 301-02 (5th Cir. 1982); D'Ambra v.
United States, 396 F. Supp. 1180, 1183-84 (D.R.I. 1973), afl'd, 518 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1975);
Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H. 647, 658, 406 A.2d 300, 307 (1979); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 436A comment c (1965) (physical manifestations resulting from emotional
disturbance may be classified as illness).
24 The term "cancerphobia" appeared as early as 1958, in Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5
N.Y.2d 16, 19, 152 N.E.2d 249, 251, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 998 (1958). Cancerphoboia describes
the apprehension that the plaintiff, as a result of being exposed to a known carcinogen, will
suffer cancer in the future. See id.
248 See, e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs, 386 Mass. 540, 542-44, 437 N.E.2d 171, 173-74
(1982) (DES case); see Fusco v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d 1181, 1183 (5th Cir.
1981) (asbestos case).
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examination of psychic harm in products liability. The most fre-
quent claims for recovery based on a "cancerphobia" theory have
been asserted by DES daughters and mothers,249 and asbestos in-
halers and their spouses. 250 Thus, the cases fall into both the "fear
for oneself' category and the "bystander" category.
The success rate for plaintiffs in the DES and asbestos cases
has not been high, even when the devastating effects of the disease
are apparent,25' so it is not surprising that the DES or asbestos
exposed plaintiff who claims as harm the fear of developing a
dreaded disease, has an even more difficult road to success. In fact,
courts, even courts demonstrating a willingness to broaden protec-
tion in the psychic harm area, have been steadfast in their refusal
to grant relief to the modern cancerphobia victim.2 52
To determine why cancerphobia claims have been unsuccess-
ful, it is necessary to examine the nature of the injury suffered by a
DES daughter and the asbestos inhaler, who have no physical
manifestations of disease. DES or asbestos exposure increases the
statistical likelihood of contracting cancer. 253 This knowledge can
249 See, e.g., Plummer v. Abbott Labs, 568 F. Supp. 920, 921 (D.R.I. 1983); Weatherill v.
University of Chicago, 563 F. Supp. 1553, 1560 (N.D. Il. 1983); Payton v. Abbot Labs, 386
Mass. 540, 542, 437 N.E.2d 171, 173 (1982). It has been estimated that by 1980 there were as
many as 1,000 DES lawsuits filed. See Podges, DES Ruling Shakes Products Liability
Field, 66 A.BA J. 827, 827 (1980). Diethylistibestrol (DES) is a synthetically produced es-
trogen that was used to avoid complications during pregnancy. Comment, DES and a Pro-
posed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 963 (1978). It was subse-
quently determined that DES caused clear-cell adencarcinoma of the uterus and vagina,
cancer, and various other pre-cancerous abnormalities. See id. at 964-65.
250 See Comment, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 871 (1983). As-
bestos-related litigation has accounted for more than 16,000 cases being filed in federal and
state courts. Id.
'51 See Note, Tort Actions for Cancer, Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental
Carcinogens, 90 YALE L.J. 840, 847 (1981). The long latency period between exposure and
manifestation of disease makes it difficult to meet traditional standards of proof. Scientific
knowledge may be insufficient to establish cause and effect, and valuable evidence may be
lost. See Phillips, Asbestos Litigation: The Test of the Tort System, 36 AR- L. REv. 343,
346-47 (1983). The plaintiff may be unable even to identify which of a variety of manufac-
turers actually manufactured the product that caused the harm. See, e.g., Gray v. United
States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 338 (S.D. Tex. 1978).
252 See infra notes 254-261 and accompanying text.
252 See Comment, supra note 249, at 964; Comment, Emotional Distress Damages for
Cancerphobia: A Case for the DES Daughter, 14 PAC. L.J. 1215, 1216 (1983). Once DES is
administered, the patient is exposed to a 100 times greater risk of developing cancer. Com-
ment, supra, at 1216. Although some estimates show that cancer develops in one of every
250 to 1000 DES-exposed daughters, see Comment, supra note 249, at 965 n.7, others claim
it occurs in only one of every 100,000, see Comment, DES and Emotional Distress: Payton
v. Abbott Labs, 37 U. MIAma L. REV. 151, 152 n.5 (1982).
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cause severe anxiety or fear of developing cancer in the future,
which has a serious impact on the lives of the DES or asbestos
exposed plaintiff, even if she never develops cancer. This is a dif-
ferent type of emotional suffering from the psychic shock exper-
ienced through seeing a loved one injured or through being in an
accident in which one has a sudden and immediate fear for one's
own life, or through handling an instrumentality that turns out to
be the agent of another's death. The kind of psychic harm suffered
by a cancerphobia victim is the torment of wondering if and when
a horrible disease will be contracted. Although not traumatic in a
clinical sense, it is a gnawing, wearing, brooding kind of anxiety
that can be as damaging as a sudden trauma. The question in a
products liability context is whether a manufacturer who is respon-
sible for creating this potential for future harm should be responsi-
ble for the present anxiety and fear that future harm will occur.
Further, because claims have been made by DES mothers and
asbestos spouses, it is necessary to determine whether they state a
cognizable claim for psychic harm based on the fear that their
loved ones might one day develop cancer. Once again, the theory
that a court chooses depends upon the state of the law in the par-
ticular jurisdiction. For the sake of clarity, the cases will be dis-
cussed according to the status of the plaintiff as either a potential
cancer victim or a bystander fearing for a loved one.
1. Fear For Self
a. Physical Harm
In Payton v. Abbott Laboratories,2 5 4 the Supreme Judicial
The inhalation of asbestos has been implicated as the cause of asbestosis, lung cancer,
and other forms of gastrointestinal cancers. See Hazards of Asbestos Exposure: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-11 (1982) (testimony of Dr. Irving Selikoff).
It has been estimated that nine million American workers were exposed to asbestos during
the 1940's and 1950's. Id. at 3. Estimates of asbestos-related deaths vary from 8500 to
67,000. See Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FoRDHAM URB.
L.J. 55, 55 (1982); Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues
Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REv. 573, 580 (1983).
1" 386 Mass. 540, 437 N.E.2d 171 (1982). In Payton, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts addressed the following question:
Does Massachusetts recognize a right of action for emotional distress and
anxiety caused by the negligence of a defendant, in the absence of any evidence of
physical harm, where such emotional stress and anxiety are the result of an in-
creased statistical likelihood [that] the plaintiff will suffer serious disease in the
future?
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Court of Massachusetts justified its decision to refuse recovery for
psychic harm absent physical injury in a cancerphobia case by
resorting to the standard reasons for rejecting claims of psychic
harm. The court focused on fear of a flood of litigation, fear of
fictitious claims, and reluctance to subject defendants to liability
for mental distress for mere negligent conduct.215
The physical injury requirement may be a difficult obstacle for
cancerphobia victims to overcome, because many of the physical
manifestations alleged by those who have had a sudden psychic
shock may not occur in the cancerphobia victim. The reasons al-
ready asserted for not requiring physical injury in a psychic harm
case, however, apply with equal force in a cancerphobia case.256
b. Present Injury
The approach taken in two recent opinions by the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has seriously jeopardized claims
brought by not-yet-ill cancerphobia victims, regardless of the legal
theory of the plaintiff's case or the approach taken by the particu-
lar jurisdiction toward recovery for psychic harm. In Jackson v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 257 and Adams v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.,258 pre-cancerous asbestos workers sued to recover for
potential cancer and for mental distress caused by their fear of
contracting cancer.259 The Fifth Circuit held in both cases that the
evidence relating to an increased statistical risk of cancer caused
by asbestos inhalation was inadmissible because a cause of action
for cancer had not yet accrued at the time of trial.2 60 The court
held that a plaintiff would suffer little detriment by being required
to wait until the physical manifestation of cancer before bringing
suit for the cancer or the psychic harm suffered through
cancerphobia. 61
In concluding that the plaintiffs had no present cause of ac-
tion fcr potential cancer, the court failed to distinguish between
something that has not yet happened-in this case, cancer-and
Id. at 544, 437 N.E.2d at 174.
25 Id. at 552-54, 437 N.E.2d at 178-79.
256 See supra notes 77, 138-143 and accompanying text.
257 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984).
25 727 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1984).
259 See Adams, 727 F.2d at 535; Jackson, 727 F.2d at 510.
26 See Adams, 727 F.2d at 537; Jackson, 727 F.2d at 522.
261 Adams, 727 F.2d at 537; Jackson, 727 F.2d at 521.
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something that has already happened-a present fear that cancer
will occur in the future. The effect of the holdings in Jackson and
Adams is to deny protection to the interest in psychic equilibrium
and once again to relegate psychic harm to the status of a parasitic
claim compensable only when appended to a cause of action for
physical injury.
The approach taken by the federal district court in Wetherill
v. University of Chicago6 2 is preferable. In Wetherill, which in-
volved a cancerphobia claim brought by DES daughters who had
no signs of disease, the plaintiffs sought to introduce evidence on
the causal relationship between DES and cancer to establish the
reasonableness of their fears.26 3 The court made it clear that the
plaintiffs sought recovery not for the increased risk of cancer but
for their fear of developing cancer. It required only a reasonable
fear of future injury, not a reasonable certainty of future injury.
The court concluded that the plaintiffs needed to establish only a
causal link between fear of future injury and the defendant's tor-
tious conduct.264 Thus, to establish cancerphobia, the plaintiff need
show only that the defendant exposed him to a carcinogen, that
the exposure resulted in an increased likelihood of developing can-
cer, and that the anxiety being suffered has caused serious psychic
harm.
The approach taken by the Wetherill court is consistent with a
recognition that tortious invasions of psychic equilibrium should
be compensated if serious harm occurs. Unlike the Fifth Circuit in
Jackson and Adams, the Wetherill court clearly distinguished be-
tween present psychic harm and potential physical harm. Although
a certain amount of inconvenience might accompany the need to
bring two lawsuits, one for psychic injury and one for subsequent
physical injury, any other approach ignores the fact that a legally
protected interest has been invaded.
i. Cancerphobia of DES Mothers and Asbestos Spouses
In a few of the cancerphobia cases, DES mothers and asbestos
spouses have claimed that they themselves will also contract can-
cer.265 Although these plaintiffs have been uniformly unsuccessful,
... 565 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Il. 1983).
263 Id. at 1559.
:64 See id.
26" The DES mothers claim they will contract cancer through their ingestion of DES,
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the reasons for rejection of these claims have varied.
One theory used to justify rejection, which is particularly alien
to recognition of psychic equilibrium as a protectable interest, is
the idea that the psychic harm must be attributable to a specific
event or accident.266 The inference to be drawn is that only certain
kinds of invasions of psychic equilibrium that result in psychic
harm will result in liability. A sudden psychic shock or trauma that
produces psychic harm may be recognized, but an invasion that
gives rise to long term brooding and depression apparently will
not. If the psychic harm is serious and reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, such a distinction is irrational. In the context of the
DES mothers and asbestos spouses, the denial of recovery is not
disturbing because the plaintiffs have been unable to establish an
increased likelihood of developing cancer. In some cases, the harm
may be serious, but in the absence of any medical evidence that
ingesting DES or living with an asbestos worker causes cancer, it
can safely be said that a person with normal ability to cope would
not suffer serious psychic harm under such circumstances. How-
ever, the requirement of an immediate psychic shock or trauma is
disturbing since it has the potential for being applied to deny re-
covery to DES daughters or asbestos inhalers. Certainly, anxiety
and depression caused by a person's knowledge that he has an in-
creased likelihood of developing cancer could result in serious
psychic harm, even in a person with normal ability to cope.
ii. Bystanders
Several cases have been brought by DES mothers and asbestos
spouses claiming recovery based either on their fear that their
loved ones will contract cancer or on their mental anguish brought
on by watching the suffering of loved ones who already have con-
tracted it. 26 7 These claims also have been rejected. Some courts
have denied recovery for the reason that bystander recovery is lim-
ited to a plaintiff who has witnessed an identifiable, traumatic
and the wives of asbestos victims through close association with their husbands. See, e.g.,
Tysenn v. Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1290, 1294 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (asbestos case);
Amader v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1031, 1032 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (asbestos
case); Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. I1. 1978) (DES case).
211 See Amader, 514 F. Supp. at 1032; Nutt v. A.C.&S. Inc., 466 A.2d 18, 23 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1983).
21' See Mink, 460 F. Supp. at 719; Amader, 514 F. Supp. at 1033; Nutt, 466 A.2d at 25.
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event affecting a close family member.26 8 This is a variation on the
theory discussed above. Courts taking this approach apparently
have concluded that the law will not protect the interest in psychic
equilibrium from an invasion that causes long term concern for the
health of a loved one, rather than immediate shock at seeing a
loved one injured. Although this justification for denying recovery
is irrational, there may be some reasons to deny recovery to family
members in cancerphobia cases. Hearts go out to those who must
helplessly stand by watching their loved ones suffer or waiting for
a horrible misfortune to befall them, but interests in limiting lia-
bility may militate against recovery in this kind of bystander case.
An application of the tests suggested earlier should provide further
support for such a denial of redress. The anger, frustration, and
grief family members of DES or asbestos exposed persons experi-
ence may be great, but it is unlikely that it will result in serious
psychic harm. In the rare case in which serious harm has occurred,
the conclusion would likely be that the normally constituted per-
son would not have suffered serious harm.
This approach is preferable to distinguishing between a sud-
den psychic shock and long term suffering, because it provides flex-
ibility and a greater chance that the seriously harmed plaintiff will
recover. The sudden psychic shock requirement would prevent re-
covery by a DES daughter or asbestos inhaler who could satisfy the
"serious harm to a normally constituted psyche" requirement.
CONCLUSION
"The entire history of the development of tort laws shows a
continuous tendency to recognize as worthy of legal protection in-
terests which previously were not protected at all."2 9 The slow
journey of the once unprotected interest in psychic equilibrium to-
ward legal protection typifies this "continuous tendency." At last,
the day has arrived to recognize that the destination has been
268 See, e.g., Amader, 514 F. Supp. at 1032-33. The courts in DES and asbestos by-
stander cases have taken the Dillon v. Legg foreseeability factors and applied them to a
factual situation that is not even remotely similar. This is one of the difficulties with a rote
application of arbitrary "foreseeability factors." Whether the decision of the California Su-
preme Court in Ochoa v. Superior Ct., 39 Cal. App. 3d 159, 703 P.2d 1, 216 Cal. Rptr. 661
(1985), in which that court recognized a claim by a parent who observed the gradual deterio-
ration of a child but not his death, will have an impact in the cancerphobia area remains to
be seen.
269 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 1 comment e (1965).
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reached. The interest in psychic equilibrium has come the final
mile and should be protected from tortious invasions of all kinds.
However, in the cases in which the interest in psychic equilibrium
and strict liability coalesce, there is a need to recognize and ac-
comodate the competing interests in the efficient administration of
justice and the avoidance of overly burdensome and indetermin-
able liability. The inconsistency in reasoning and results is obvious.
The foregoing review of cases illustrates the need for a uniform
approach which takes into account all the interests at stake. A de-
termination of liability reached through a broad determination of
the scope of the risk and tempered by a conclusion that the
psychic harm suffered by one with a normal ability to cope should
satisfy any remaining fears that protection of psychic equilibrium
in strict products liability would result in runaway liability. If this
approach is taken, no reason remains to deny the interest in
psychic equilibrium full protection regardless of the nature of the
tortious invasion or the theory of the plaintiff's case.
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